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 ABSTRACT 
This doctoral thesis is aimed at analyzing behavioral distortions in public 
schools and outlining outcome-oriented performance measurement systems that 
prevent and mitigate them. An instrumental view of Dynamic Performance 
Management (DPM) is used to support that endeavor by 1) identifying how 
performance drivers impact on outcome and output end-results, 2) determining how 
end-results affect strategic resources, and 3) understanding how strategic resources 
and benchmarks define the dynamics of performance drivers. This approach is also 
used to foster a shift from an output to an outcome-based view in performance 
management, intending to pursue sustainable results in the long-term. 
The case of the Colombian public schools has been analyzed to frame 
behavioral distortions associated with performance measurement systems. Test-
based accountability systems are often used to assess school performance. An 
inconsistent design of these measurement systems may provoke the emergence of 
dysfunctional behaviors, which may jeopardize school outcomes such as educational 
quality. The case-study presented in this research illustrates how an excessive focus 
on improving test scores caused narrowing of the school curricula. In particular, a 
DPM simulation model has been built to show how an outcome-oriented view may 
support policy makers and system designers on dealing with behavioral distortions 
from the use of school assessment systems. 
In order to design the simulation model, an experimental approach has been 
used in this research through the analysis of the following performance measures in 
the Colombian case-study. Strategic resources: Lower and Higher knowledge 
students; Performance drivers: Fraction of time allocated to traditional teaching, 
Fraction of time allocated to holistic education, Students knowledge ratio, and 
Balance and scope of learning ratio; End-result: Net change in Higher knowledge 
students. 
The above variables are proposed, as an initial step, to assess Colombian 
public schools’ performance through the lenses of a DPM approach. As a result, 
dysfunctional behaviors -that may emerge due to inconsistent test-based 
accountability systems- can be counteracted effectively. 
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1) INTRODUCTION 
1.1) Problem relevance 
Performance Measurement Systems (PMS) affect actions towards a direction 
that contributes to achieve relevant outcomes. Such systems are never neutral to 
individuals and organizations. An inconsistent design of PMS -regarding the system 
of rules in an organization (Borgonovi, 1996) and the outcomes of decision makers’ 
actions- may generate dysfunctional side-effects (Smith, 1993; Bianchi and Williams, 
2015).  
In social contexts, there is a high risk that people adjust their actions to meet 
targets, regardless of the ability of such results to affect organizational outcomes 
positively (Bianchi and Salazar Rua, 2017). Benchmarking is a common practice to 
hold public organizations accountable for performance, however PMS can be 
manipulated to maximize individual pay-offs (Radnor, 2005; Smith, 1995). As 
Campbell (1969) stated “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social 
decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures, and the more 
apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social pressures it is intended to monitor”. 
Behavioral distortions occur due to inconsistencies in the design of PMS. 
These types of behaviors are often reinforced by rewards granted mechanistically if 
performance targets are achieved. It produces an increase in outputs and a 
decrease in outcomes in the short- and long-term respectively (Bianchi, 2016). In this 
context, dealing with behavioral distortions becomes crucial for the achievement of 
relevant outcomes. To this end, an approach aimed at fostering a shift from an 
output to an outcome-based view in performance management is required (Bianchi, 
2012; Bianchi and Rivenbark, 2014). Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) is 
used in this research to meet this need. 
This dissertation frames behavioral distortions, from the use of school 
performance measurement systems, through Dynamic Performance Management 
(DPM). The case-study of the Colombian public schools has been used to show how 
dysfunctional behaviors can be prevented and mitigated by using an outcome-
oriented view in outlining school assessment systems. In the Colombian context, 
despite government efforts to improve educational quality, school performance has 
  
2 
been lower than the targets in national and international standardized tests. This has 
caused a growing concern among the educational authorities, who are looking for 
definite answers to this issue. Experts in the field assert that a low level in students’ 
knowledge acquisition is related to unintended behavioral effects caused by test-
based accountability systems. Such performance measurement systems influence 
teaching strategies in public schools for the purpose of attaining targets and rewards 
(Hamilton et al., 2002). Hence, traditional teaching (i.e. type of education aimed at 
building basic notions in students through rote learning activities and exam 
preparations) is often prioritized over holistic education (i.e. type of education aimed 
at building complex learning skills through interdisciplinary projects, student 
portfolios and advisories). As a result, educational outcomes, such as educational 
quality, might be in danger because of goal displacement (Sills, 1957). 
Concepts and experiences from the fields of performance management and 
education have also been integrated by using an instrumental view of Dynamic 
Performance Management (DPM). This view enables the identification of 
performance measures (e.g. strategic resources, performance drivers and end-
results) to outline feedback mechanisms, which describe unintended behavioral 
effects. Likewise, efforts have been devoted to clarify how an inconsistent design of 
test-based accountability systems may induce schoolteachers to game the system. A 
DPM model has been used to explain the previous phenomenon and provide policy 
recommendations on how to enhance school assessment systems through an 
outcome-oriented perspective. These policy recommendations have been intended 
to counteract behavioral distortions that may emerge as a response to government 
pressure for increasing test scores and myopic compensation schemes. In addition, 
the Colombian case-study emphasizes the need for enhancing collaboration among 
distinct stakeholders in the education sector. This implies that shared strategic 
resources should be identified with the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of 
public policies. Thus, a consistent alignment between outputs and outcomes in the 
school context is crucial to improve educational quality.  
The design of control systems (Flamholtz, 1983; Simons,1995; Ouchi 1979) 
has also been linked to the theory of street-level bureaucracies (Lipsky, 1980; 
Mintzberg, 1979) to set the conceptual roots on how to outline outcome-oriented 
performance measurement systems through DPM. On the one hand, from an 
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institutional perspective, this implies that DPM models should subtly embody the 
notions of both diagnostic and interactive control systems, the organizational 
structure, the organizational culture and the organizational environment. Likewise, 
DPM models should be designed by taking into account the characteristics of 
professional bureaucracies and clan controls. As a result, these simulation models 
could be used to foster feedback analysis, strategic dialogue, and information 
sharing in organizations. On the other hand, from an inter-institutional perspective, 
the attainment of outcomes requires that a multi-level and multi-actor approach is 
implemented. Such approach can be supported by means of an alignment between 
organizational outputs and community outcomes. Therefore, pursuing outcomes in 
the local area goes beyond the design and implementation of performance measures 
and policies in single institutions. DPM can be used as an outcome-oriented 
approach to support decision makers and system designers in outlining consistent 
performance measurement systems that foster a common shared view among 
distinct stakeholders. 
 In particular, DPM has been used in this thesis to support the design of 
school assessment systems in the Colombian context, intending to 1) deal with 
behavioral distortions caused by the use of inconsistent performance measures and 
2) enhance the achievement of school outcomes such as educational quality.  
1.2) Objective and Research questions  
Objective 
To use Dynamic Performance Management as an approach to analyze 
behavioral distortions in public schools, and to outline outcome-oriented performance 
measurement systems that may prevent and mitigate them. 
Research questions 
1) Can performance measurement systems trigger behavioral distortions? 
2) What are the characteristics of such performance measurement systems that 
generate dysfunctional behaviors?  
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3) In which fields can behavioral distortions be found from the use of 
performance measurement systems? Why? 
4) What is the contribution of Dynamic Performance Management to deal with 
behavioral distortions?  
5) How can behavioral distortions be framed in the Colombian public schools? 
1.3) Thesis outline 
In order to analyze behavioral distortions in public schools and outline 
outcome-oriented performance measurement systems aimed at preventing and 
mitigating them through Dynamic Performance Management (DPM), this doctoral 
thesis has been structured as follows. 
The second chapter comprises relevant literature on: Behavioral distortions 
from the use of performance measurement systems, School assessment systems, 
and the Colombian education system. Likewise, the scientific framework of this 
research is discussed. In the first instance, the conceptual roots of an outcome-
oriented view in performance management are analyzed. To this end, the design of 
control systems in organizations is connected with the theory of street-level 
bureaucracy and clan controls. In the second instance, DPM is explained, and it is 
proposed as a consistent approach to support the attainment of sustainable 
outcomes. 
The third chapter describes the research methodology. The rationale for 
adopting DPM, the research design, the model building approach, and the research 
outputs are examined. The aim of both second and third chapter is to provide the 
reader with the foundations for comprehending the analysis of the Colombian case-
study, which is carried out in the next chapter. 
 The fourth chapter discusses the modeling strategy and simulation results. In 
the first instance, feedback mechanisms that describe the emergence of behavioral 
distortions -associated with school assessment systems- are outlined. Posteriorly, a 
DPM chart and a DPM model about the case of the Colombian public schools are 
analyzed. Both of them have been designed through an outcome-oriented view in 
performance management. The simulation results from the DPM model have been 
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used to propose sustainable policies aimed at counteracting behavioral distortions in 
the Colombian context.  
The fifth chapter concludes this dissertation by 1) presenting a summary of the 
main discussions, 2) determining the contribution of the research to the existing 
knowledge, and 3) explaining the limitations of the study and providing indications for 
further research. 
The appendices provide the reader with further resources to extend the 
analysis and discussions presented throughout this thesis. In Appendix A, the 
Colombian reward system is depicted. Such reward system mainly relies on test 
scores to allocate financial and social benefits to teachers and public schools. 
Appendices B and C portray the English version of two surveys that were designed 
to collect the primary data of this research. Appendix D reveals the equations that 
were used to build the DPM model. This information enables the reader to replicate 
the simulation results and increase transparency in the research.  
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2) LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1) Behavioral distortions from the use of performance measurement systems 
2.1.1) Basic notions of performance measurement systems 
Performance measurement is often perceived as mandatory for business 
success (Platts and Sobotka, 2010). This is the reason why different frameworks, 
methodologies and tools for performance measurement have been developed 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Bourne et al., 2002; De Waal, 2004). Using measurement 
systems aimed at measuring and tracking performance became popular in the 
private sector in 1980. Several scholars were pioneers in this movement by 
introducing the use of scientific methods and techniques into the businesses sector 
to support goal attainment (Kaplan and Norton, 1993; Deming, 1986; Forester, 
1993). Such methods and techniques allowed system designers to identify 
quantifiable indicators related to organizational tasks, intending to make mission and 
vision statements explicit. In addition, these indicators enabled decision makers to 
determine performance over time and compare current values with benchmarks for 
the purpose of drawing conclusions. In the 1980s, this was an innovation to assess 
organizational performance, as the use of inspections was widely extended yet. The 
quantitative approach related to the measurements contrasted with the subjective 
and intuitive nature of the traditional inspections (McGinnes and Elandy, 2012). 
Radnor (2005) defines performance measurement as gauging the results of 
an activity. Similarly, Simons (1995) conceives the performance measurement 
system as the formal routines and procedures used by managers to keep or change 
organizational patterns. Throughout the years, this practice -aimed at increasing 
efficiency and effectiveness- has gained a growing acceptation (Brigham and 
Fitzgerald, 2001) among distinct professionals (e.g. policy makers, consultants and 
academics).  
De Lancer Julnes (2006) describes the components of any performance 
measurement system as follows.  
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• Inputs: These are the resources required to produce organizational outputs. In 
public education, classroom materials, teachers’ experience and expenditures 
per student are examples of this measure.  
• Outputs: They make up the final products or services that should lead to the 
achievement of the desired outcomes. In the education sector, scores in 
standardized tests are a popular output that is used to assess schools’ 
performance and design public policies. In theory, high test scores should 
lead to an improvement in outcomes such as educational quality. 
• Outcomes: These are the long-term consequences of the outputs in the whole 
system. They are often difficult to quantify due to their broad and complex 
nature. Examples of school outcomes are family involvement in the learning 
process and educational quality. 
In addition, Ridgway (1956) developed a classification system based on 
single, multiple, and composite criteria to analyze the impact of using different 
measures on organizational performance. The criteria are explained as follows. 
Single criteria imply that only one indicator is used to gauge performance. For 
instance, in the 1950s the Soviet industries measured organizational success as a 
function of monthly production targets (Berliner, 1956). Other performance measures 
were not significantly taken into account. 
Multiple criteria denote the use of simultaneous variables to evaluate 
organizational progress. This type of criteria is based on the premise that 
organizational performance goes beyond the achievement of a single output. It looks 
for fostering the investment of efforts in a range of tasks that will allow the 
organization to grow balanced. 
Composite criteria are used to calculate merged measures by assigning 
weights to each performance variable. For example, in Colombia, the Synthetic 
Education Quality Index (ISCE) is a merged measure used to assess public schools’ 
performance. Such performance is calculated as an average result from four 
dimensions (i.e. progress, performance, efficiency and school environment), which 
have different weights (Zambrano, 2015). 
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2.1.2) Supporting organizations through performance measurement systems 
In the literature, several frameworks aimed at supporting the assessment of 
organizational performance have been identified. Some of them include the balanced 
scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992), the performance pyramid (Lynch and Cross 
1991) and the performance prism (Neely et al., 2001). Three decades ago, these 
frameworks represented an important innovation in the performance management 
field because performance was mainly associated with financial measures before 
their introduction. Including non-financial variables -such as those related to 
customers, internal process and innovation- represented a different view to 
understand the rationales behind a high-quality service delivery. However, societies 
all over the world have rapidly evolved, and in parallel, the complexity and magnitude 
of their problems have grown up. This has made that those priceless frameworks, 
which initially were an insightful answer to understand organizational performance, 
have lost their inner glow. One of the most important causes related to this 
phenomenon is their static nature (Todd, 2000), which contrasts with the dynamism 
of the current world. In these circumstances, novel research in performance 
measurement systems has arisen to support the decision-making process in modern 
organizations (Santos et al., 2002; Youngblood, 2003; Li and Maani, 2011; 
Castellano et al., 2004; Bianchi, 2016). 
Performance indicators are prevalently used to assist decision-making in both 
public and private organizations. However, several scholars have claimed that such 
indicators are linear and ignore the effect of trade-offs in the system (Bianchi, 2016; 
Santos et al., 2002). Others argue that performance measures induce individuals to 
be driven by a short-term view (Youngblood, 2003), which lacks a meaningful 
purpose for the entire organization. In the same line, further research suggests that 
indicators may 1) neglect the contribution of interactive control systems, 2) fail to 
support the process view, and 3) make people misconceive the role of benchmarking 
(Castellano et al., 2004). As a result, unexpected over-reactions might be triggered 
and over-interventions might subsequently be implemented in organizational 
environments (Li and Maani, 2011). In this regard, Smith (1990) denotes how the 
extensive use of performance indicators to hold public institutions accountable may 
push managers to work through a narrow perspective. Under this position, measures 
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are often linked to political goals according to individual, rather than group, interests. 
The author also emphasizes that performance indicators may lead to a fragmental 
view on managing public services, which may make it difficult for decision makers to 
perceive the whole picture of the system. This may reduce the chances of dealing 
with complex social problems.  
Decision makers should know the principle of opportunity-cost. In performance 
management, this implies that the choice to improve performance in a certain 
organizational area may cause a performance reduction in other areas, as multiple 
conflicting goals may exist. In the scientific literature, this concept is also known as 
“trade-offs” (Skinner,1969). Several scholars assert that trade-offs are inherent to 
organizational contexts (Santos et al., 2002). Therefore, decision makers must 
comprehend how to select among diverse scenarios that might have positive or 
negative impacts on performance. Thus, a proper choice may lead to a consistent 
investment of resources, which may help organizations improve the delivery of 
outcomes. 
2.1.3) Criticisms of using performance measures 
Public organizations are expected to work in the delivery of community 
outcomes (e.g. quality of life, local attractiveness, educational quality, trust in 
government, civic-mindedness). The results of such organizations are made 
accountable by performance indicators. However, criticisms associated with the use 
of measurements have arisen as described below. 
In the first instance, the relation between the use of performance measures 
and the successful performance in an organization is not entirely clear. Some studies 
have found positive effects of using performance measurement systems in 
organizations (Lingle and Schiemann, 1996; Gubman, 1998; Evans 2004). However, 
other studies have found partial or contrary effects (Neely et al., 2004; Ittner, 2003; 
Austin and Gittel, 2002; Bourne and Franco, 2003; Smith, 1993). For instance, Neely 
et al. (2004) carried out a comparative analysis in two divisions of an energy 
distribution company. In one division, performance was assessed through the use of 
formal performance measurement systems. In the other division, flexible rules for 
performance evaluation were used. The authors of this study did not find real 
advantages in the level of sales and profits from using a particular approach to 
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gauge performance. Similarly, Bourne and Franco (2003) found that managers 
perceived activities related to performance measurement as negative to 
organizational performance because of its highly bureaucratic nature. Some 
managers even thought their employees should use time at work to develop new 
projects rather than spending it on data reporting. In education, the use of 
performance measures based on school inspections are controversial since positive 
and negative effects on the achievement of learning outcomes have been denoted in 
the literature (Klerks, 2013). On the one hand, several findings support the fact that 
using school inspections as an evaluation mechanism may positively influence the 
improvement of educational quality (Hanushek and Raymond, 2005; Luginbuhl et al., 
2009). On the other hand, some findings in the field do not relate inspections to an 
enhancement of school performance (Cullingford and Daniels, 1999; Shaw et al., 
2003; Rosenthal, 2004). 
In the second instance, performance indicators neglect contextual factors that 
impact on organizational performance. Therefore, performance comparisons are 
often perceived as unfair because of external influences out of managerial control. 
For example, Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002) found that Dutch police officers were 
incorrectly judged to have low performance levels compared to past statistics. 
However, the scholars discovered that crime patterns in the Netherlands had also 
changed in the last decades, and such information had not been taken into account 
in the current measurement systems. In healthcare, Sipkoff (2007) found that using 
performance results to contrast hospitals from the British National Health Service 
(NHS) was not a wise decision, as demographical differences and typology of 
patients were not appropriately considered by the indicators. Similarly, in education, 
Brown (2005) stated that ranking public schools through performance statistics is 
arbitrary since these measures favor institutions in wealthy areas. In the same line, 
Bosker and Scheerens (2000) asserted that school league tables overlook students’ 
socio-economic conditions. The previous two investigations denote that variations 
among school performance may reflect not only the use of distinct teaching 
strategies but also the existence of contextual factors that go beyond teachers and 
principals’ responsibilities. 
In the third instance, difficulties in selecting and agreeing in the most 
appropriate measures to be implemented in each organizational unit are recurrent, 
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as conflicting goals among agencies represent the norm rather than the exception. 
Consequently, to determine whether the organizational efforts are being addressed 
towards the achievement of community outcomes may be complicated (Adab et al., 
2002; Hodgson et al., 2007). This point of view is supported by research in the field 
that has detected a misalignment of performance measures used in different 
institutional hierarchies across public agencies (Micheli and Neely, 2010). As a 
result, such misalignment may lead to ambiguous goals which make it difficult to 
have a clear picture of how individual actions are linked to organizational 
performance (Buchanan 1974; Lan and Rainey, 1992; Perry and Porter, 1982; 
Rainey, 1993). Likewise, implementing reward mechanisms might contravene the 
improvement of the service delivery, as weak performance measures might be used 
(Han Chun and Rainey, 2006).  
In the fourth instance, outcomes are difficult to be quantified. Therefore, they 
are often operationalized as a set of short-term outputs (e.g. solved crimes per year, 
the number of fines per month, students’ scores in the standardized tests). Problems 
arise as politicians -in the attempt to improve results during their mandates- put 
excessive pressure over street-level bureaucrats to maximize outputs. It fosters the 
development of strategies that prioritize outputs over outcomes, which may be 
translated into dysfunctional behaviors in the long-term such as gaming and goal 
displacement (Bohte and Meier, 2000). 
Last, dysfunctional effects -caused by performance measurement systems- 
have been detected in multiple domains (Goddard et al., 2004; Pidd, 2005; Bird et 
al., 2005). For instance, in mobility, the Shadow Strategic Rail Authority (SSRA) 
informed that British train operators missed stations to attain performance measures 
based on punctuality (SSRA, 2000). In safety, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC) stated that in England the number of crimes is even four times 
higher than the reported by the police (HMIC, 2000). This report 1) provided 
evidence of crimes that are not registered in the data-base until they are solved, and 
2) brought to light intentional misclassifications of crimes in order to meet quotas. In 
healthcare, a study revealed that waiting lists are reduced in particular months by 
increasing the initial time to have an appointment with doctors (McCartney and 
Brown, 1999). Similarly, Werner and Asch (2005) found that some doctors 
prescribed cancer screening procedures to reach targets, even if such procedures 
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were not advisable. In education, experiments in schools illustrated how feedbacks 
may paradoxically cause detrimental effects on the achievement of long-term 
outcomes. Such effects have principally been observed during the execution of 
cognitive tasks (Visscher and Coe, 2003; Kluger and DeNisi, 1996). 
2.1.4) Side-effects of performance measures 
Performance measurement systems are based on the premise that holding 
individuals and organizations accountable leads to an improvement in the quality of 
services. However, this assumption is controversial because several side-effects 
have been identified. For instance, in the mid-1990s, Argyris (1952) conducted a 
study on behavioral distortions and its impact on the achievement of organizational 
outcomes. In this research, the effects of using budgets to measure organizational 
performance were analyzed through a case-study. Argyris reported that employees 
in a factory prioritized “easy orders” to meet quotas at the end of a financial period. 
This strategy triggered delays in the delivery of previous orders, as they were not 
finished in the same sequence in which they were received. This implied a violation 
of the procedures and rules in the organization (Jaworski and Young, 1992).  
The above example -of dysfunctional behaviors associated with performance 
measurement systems- denote the importance of 1) identifying common side-effects 
caused by the adopted indicators in organizations (Smith, 1993), and 2) designing 
consistent performance measures to prevent and mitigate such detrimental effects 
(Bianchi, 2016). This may help policymakers understand the reasons that induce 
people to manipulate the system to maximize their pay-off, and consequently to 
formulate strategies that align individual and organizational interests. 
Smith (1993) identified side-effects of using performance measures in 
organizations. These effects are described below. 
• Myopia: A focus on short-term activities at the expense of long-term goals. 
• Ossification: A reluctance to experiment new approaches. 
• Tunnel vision: A preference for “easy to measure” targets. 
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• Sub-optimization: A fragmental approach that leads to an unbalanced growth 
of different organizational areas. 
• Measure fixation: The focus of attention shifts from the intended outcome to 
the measured output. 
• Misrepresentation: Fraud and making up results are used to produce an 
impression of outstanding performance. 
In a similar vein to Smith, other scholars have also noted further behavioral 
distortions associated with the use of performance indicators. These are listed as 
follows. 
• Illegal acts and Falsification: An intentional modification in the data to satisfy 
particular standards and requirements (Mars, 1982; Vaughn, 1983; Simon and 
Eitzen, 1986). 
• Biasing and Focusing: Data reporting aimed at emphasizing favorable 
circumstances for the manager and the organization (Birnberg et al., 1983). 
• Smoothing: A deliberate alteration of the data flow that does not affect the 
achievement of outputs in a given  period (Ronen and Sadan, 1981). 
• Filtering: Information withholding to avoid negative reactions from superiors 
(Read, 1962; O’Reilly and Roberts, 1974; Birnberg et al., 1983). 
The above behavioral distortions have been categorized by Jaworski and 
Young (1992) as “Strategic information manipulations” because the performance 
measurement system is affected directly. This author has also defined a further 
category of dysfunctional practices called “Gaming performance indicators”. This 
category implies that the processes are perversely affected but the rules are not 
broken. It leads to maximize personal benefits at the expense of organizational 
goals. “Gaming of a performance measure is said to exist when the subordinate 
knowingly selects his activities so as to achieve a more favorable measure on the 
surrogate used by the superior for evaluation at the expense of selecting an 
alternative course of action that would result in a more desirable level of 
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performance as far as the superior’s true goal is concerned” (Birnberg et al., 1983, p. 
123, as cited in Soobaroyen, 2005). 
2.1.5) Gaming performance measurement systems 
Gaming is a dysfunctional behavior that has been defined in multiple ways. 
Smith (1995) describes gaming as an inclination to take advantage of the system of 
rules. This behavior results from using the wrong variables to assess performance. 
Similarly, Courty and Marschke (2007, p. 905) label gaming as “undesirable 
responses that the designers of performance measures did not foresee”. This 
definition emerged as the result of empirical analyses carried out in federal job 
training programs. In this research, the scholars found that implementers developed 
program-compliance strategies aimed at improving performance outputs significantly 
(Courty and Marschke, 2004). In addition, Kelman and Friedman (2009, p.924) 
define gaming as a “behavior that consumes real resources but produces no genuine 
performance improvement even on a measured dimension”. This definition implies 
the creation of a false image of organizational progress. 
Gaming has also been conceived as a set of unintended managerial 
responses to accountability systems designed to support policy implementation 
(Terman and Yang, 2016). Such unintended responses are described in the 
literature as follows. 
• Threshold effect: It implies that performance measurement systems 
encourage people to meet organizational goals but discourage them to 
exceed such goals (Bird et al., 2005). 
• Ratchet effect: This results from setting future targets through an increase of 
previous targets (Hood, 2006). Under this effect, people repeatedly report low 
performance levels to prevent managers from setting higher goals (Goddard 
et al., 2004). This effect also makes people lack organizational commitment in 
the long-term, as they gradually look for reducing their investment of efforts. 
• Output distortion: This dysfunctional behavior is denoted as “hitting the target 
and missing the point” (Hood, 2006, p. 516). This type of gaming implies that 
organizational outputs are achieved at the expense of community outcomes, 
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which compromises the real purpose of the measures. For instance, Oppel 
and Shear (2014) found that the United States Department of Veterans Affairs 
kept some veterans on a secret waiting list for months -before registering 
them into the patient tracking system- to meet the 14 days target. 
In a similar vein, Bohte and Meier (2000) describe the concept of gaming as 
an attempt to manipulate performance measures. These system manipulations are 
detailed below. 
• Cutting corners: It refers to a managerial approach that prioritizes quantity 
over quality to deliver outcomes. In this category, decision makers place their 
efforts in the production of outputs regardless of the impact of their actions on 
the whole system (Levine et al., 1990). For instance, public schools may 
graduate students that have not acquired an adequate knowledge level to 
increase graduation rates. These dysfunctional behaviors often emerge in 
contexts where the achievement of outcomes is crucial but resource 
availability is constrained. As a result, organizations spread their efforts 
across a wide range of outputs rather than in a few of them, intending not to 
be perceived as unproductive (Bohte and Meier, 2000). 
• Biasing samples: In this type of gaming, individuals and agencies only select 
and report cases with a high probability of producing positive results. This 
phenomenon is known as “cream- skimming” and it implies a perverse 
alteration of organizational efforts (Wilson, 1989). For instance, it has been 
found that some teachers focus their efforts on increasing the number of white 
people who pass university entrance exams while they reduce attention on 
minority pass rates, as the latter group usually scores lower in the tests (Bohte 
and Meier, 2000). 
• Lying: This is a high-risk method of organizational gaming, as it implies a loss 
of trust between managerial and political divisions (Bohte and Meier, 2000). 
This dysfunctional strategy is often used to hide disadvantageous information 
and portray results that favor particular interests (Downs, 1967). In this regard, 
Meier (1985) claimed that the manager of the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Superfund toxic waste cleanup program intentionally lied about her 
reports to show an impartial image of the inspections that were carried out in 
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toxic waste sites during the 1980s. Such reports were based on personal 
rather than objective criteria. 
According to the scientific literature, the most common causes of gaming 
behaviors in public and private organizations are the design of poor performance 
measures (Greener, 2005) along with the use of output-oriented rewards (Heinrich, 
2002; Courty and Marschke, 2004). These two causes may induce people to turn 
away tasks that require high investment of resources and devote more time and 
energy to those activities “easy to do”. For instance, Figlio and Rouse (2006) found 
that schoolteachers focused their efforts on the lowest performing students in the 
standardized tests, as their scores were easier to increase than the highest 
performing students. This strategy allowed them to receive performance bonuses.  
On the other hand, the emergence of behavioral distortions may also imply a 
not-recognized problem. Gaming behaviors may also arise as a response to 
irrational goals set by politicians (Terman and Yang, 2016). In these circumstances, 
efforts to achieve short-term outputs are symbolic gestures to please a political 
agenda rather than to enhance the delivery of outcomes. However, this topic is 
beyond the scope of this research.  
2.1.6) The relationship between gaming and output-oriented rewards 
Heinrich and Marschke (2010) declare that distinct reward mechanisms aimed 
at aligning individual actions with organizational goals have been applied during the 
design of performance measurement systems. Social and financial benefits are 
linked to the attainment of outputs for the purpose of improving organizational 
performance. In particular, Rothstein (2008) carried out a detailed review on the use 
of compensation models in different organizational and geographical contexts. The 
scholar analyzed the use of performance indicators and rewards in: Soviet 
manufacturing enterprises, several transportation companies in Chile, the Britain’s 
National Health Service (NHS), and test-based accountability systems. 
In parallel, psychological research has also been conducted on the use of 
incentives and its impact on building up motivation (Skinner, 1938; Deci et al., 1999). 
In particular, the scientific literature distinguishes two types of motivation. Intrinsic 
motivation, which implies the enjoyment of an activity for its own sake. This type of 
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motivation is increased by using internal rewards (e.g. public recognition). 
Alternatively, people may have an extrinsic motivation that is enhanced by external 
rewards such as financial benefits (Platts and Sobotka, 2010). For instance, in 
healthcare, Davies et al. (2000) claimed that practitioners, from the British National 
Health Service (NHS), were primarily driven by internal rewards to improve the 
quality of the services. In education, several scholars argue that the use of incentives 
may boost performance in public schools (Hanushek et al., 1994; Kemmerer and 
Windham, 1997; Odden and Kelley, 1997). Further research suggests that 
schoolteachers are mainly motivated by internal rewards and students’ satisfaction 
(Kelley, 1999; Heneman, 1999). However, it does not imply a null preference for 
financial benefits. In fact, it has also been found that payment schemes related to 
performance may positively influence schoolteachers’ behaviors (Ladd, 1999). The 
above studies show how the use of reward mechanisms has been a spread practice 
in multiple policy domains during the last years. Thus, rewards can be used to 
address individual behaviors towards the achievement of organizational and 
community outcomes. 
On the other hand, side-effects from the use of rewards in organizations have 
also been evidenced. Kohn (1999) suggests the existence of a perverse effect of 
using rewards to assess performance, as people may get used to them. As a result, 
they may develop tactics to improve the “numbers”. It provokes a loss of meaning in 
the adopted indicators. Similarly, Pollitt (2005) found that public sector employees 
learnt how to increase their scores in the measures for which they were made 
accountable. This scholar concluded that the power of indicators falls over time, and 
therefore they should be replaced periodically. Furthermore, Kohn (1999) also 
demonstrated how pressure -generated by incentive programs- may induce 
salespeople to game the system by prioritizing the sale of products for which they 
receive greater financial benefits. Likewise, the researcher proved that the chances 
of unethical behaviors are risen due to external incentives. Kohn’s research outlines 
the dangers associated with performance measurement systems that strongly rely 
on rewards to address individual behaviors. These reward mechanisms may make 
people prefer “easy to reach” outputs at the expense of long-term outcomes. 
In a similar vein, Platts and Sobotka (2010) argue that dysfunctional behaviors 
from the use of performance measurement systems are tightly related to reward 
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systems and staff motivation. According to research in the field, performance 
measurement systems that rely on external rewards may reduce intrinsic motivation 
in the long-term (Deci, 1971; Deci, 1972; Deci, 1976; Weiner, 1980; Deci, Betlly et 
al., 1981; Levine and Broderick, 1983; Jordan, 1986; Shalley, Oldham et al., 1987; 
Kreps, 1997; Deci, Koestner et al., 2001). Therefore, the design of performance 
measures tied to external rewards may not be enough to achieve targets (Kunz and 
Pfaff, 2002). 
In addition, gaming the system may emerge as a consequence of linking 
performance to both targets and budgets. It may eventually produce a 
counterproductive effect that may affect organizational performance (Jensen, 2003). 
Jensen argues that performance measurement systems -based on rewards and 
sanctions- make people inclined to lie and cheat, as punitive actions are forecasted if 
targets are not achieved. He also asserts that once people were forced to cheat due 
to the system of rules, they will rarely change their mindsets and they will even 
spread this dysfunctional behavior in further organizational dimensions. Other 
scholars argue that gaming behaviors may be conceived as a rational, rather than 
irrational, response to restrictive performance measurement systems that influence 
human relations. Exerting pressure -through control mechanisms based on rewards- 
may lead to an increase in organizational stress and tension. Moreover, if rewards 
are not distributed fairly, people will adjust their actions to favor non-cooperative 
settings (Ouchi, 1979). Thus, dysfunctional behaviors may appear from the adoption 
of performance measures that are incorrectly aligned to reward systems. 
2.1.7) Behavioral distortions in public schools 
The emergence of behavioral distortions in public schools -due to an 
inconsistent design of performance measures- is the main concern of this doctoral 
thesis. Hence, this section has been devoted to discuss previous research about 
dysfunctional behaviors in education.  
Over the last decades, performance measurement systems have been used 
around the world to hold schools and teachers accountable for student achievement. 
In particular, the use of performance statistics has become an extended practice in 
public education (Goddard and Mannion, 2004). These statistics are reported 
regularly to the audience by means of league tables, intending to rank school 
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performance. This implies that public schools are classified according to their results 
in standardized tests (McGinnes and Elandy, 2012; Goldstein and Spiegelhalter, 
1996). In particular, school decision makers and politicians often design and 
implement educational policies based on such tests and tables (Hamilton et al., 
2002).  
School performance indicators are assumed to be self-evident. As a result, 
decisions that lack an exploratory view to improve school performance may be done 
(Strand, 1997). In addition, in the school context, measures recurrently embody a 
“carrot and stick” approach by which institutions are rewarded or sanctioned based 
on their results (Jacobs et al., 2006). This approach is grounded on the idea that 
schoolteachers will improve service delivery if their efforts are linked to outputs. 
Public schools contribute to the development of society by a high-quality 
education service. Schools are expected to promote cultural unity, enhance 
intellectual and economic life, and turn out “well-educated” citizens that support 
social and political initiatives (Tyack and Cuban 1995; Smith, 1998). Therefore, 
public schools are held accountable for a range of outputs such as graduation rates, 
test scores, and pass rates on the college entrance exams (Smith, 1994). However, 
the existence of multiple goals and performance targets raises the probability of an 
inversion between means and ends. This phenomenon is reinforced by limited 
financial conditions and high-pressure levels from external entities such as the 
government (Bohte and Meier, 2000). Likewise, perception of unfairness regarding 
how the measurement systems determine the organizational performance and how 
compensation schemes distribute social and financial benefits may rationally induce 
people to engage in behaviors that maximize their pay-off to the detriment of the 
service delivery (McGinnes and Elandy, 2012). Particularly, motivation to game the 
system may be an expected consequence of designing inconsistent measures 
(Bianchi and Williams, 2015). On this subject, Berman (2002) found that people 
learnt to use performance indicators as a means to get political and financial 
advantages. 
It has been observed that dysfunctional behaviors -such as gaming and goal 
displacement- emerge because of a disproportionate focus on improving scores in 
standardized tests (Bohte and Meier, 2000). These scholars asserted that low-
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income public schools in the USA were prompt to game the system to produce 
comparable results to those schools with better financial conditions. Moreover, Bohte 
and Meier claimed that incentive structures -aligned with performance measures- 
may lead people to cheat the system as an attempt to maximize their benefits. In the 
same line, Lynn (1996) affirmed that public agencies may intentionally execute 
actions that will enhance output-measures to the detriment of desirable community 
outcomes. It occurs because of performance and reward criteria that make people 
lose their purpose for the development of society (Blau and Meyer, 1971; Downs, 
1967). As a result, reward mechanisms divert attention away from achieving 
organizational goals and foster an individualistic culture. For instance, Garcia (1995) 
detected an “alarming relationship” between correct answers and erasures on 
students' reading tests in an American public school. This behavior was an 
unintended consequence of a school performance program that offered financial 
benefits to schoolteachers and principals based on score improvements in 
standardized tests. Therefore, the nature of the reward system may influence school 
responses.  
In a similar vein, in the 1990s, an improvement in student performance was 
observed after implementing reward mechanisms (Elmore et al., 1996). However, 
similar effects occurred in other schools, while a suspicious shift in school strategies 
was implemented. This “strategic adaptation” resulted from the desire of increasing 
bonus payments (Kelley, 1998). Analogously, further side-effects in public schools 
(e.g. increase in stress and pressure levels, cheating in standardized tests, gaming 
the system, narrowing the curricula) have also been framed by the literature 
(Clotfelter and Ladd, 1996; Kelley and Protsik, 1997; Koretz, 1996). 
The organizational culture may also influence the emergence of gaming 
behaviors as observed by Vasquez Heilig and Darling-Hammond (2008). The 
scholars carried out interviews to principals and teachers from Texas public schools, 
and they found that dysfunctional strategies (e.g. holding back and suspending 
students) were performed to boost scores in standardized tests. Using such 
strategies was usually justified by means of a culture based on assessments, 
evaluations, and performance indicators. In addition, the scholars found that some 
public schools refused the enrollment of low-performing students as they could affect 
the accountabilities negatively. 
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2.1.8) Recommendations to deal with behavioral distortions 
A significant increase in accountability has been observed in the public sector 
over the last decades. In parallel, a raising number of behavioral dysfunctions - 
caused by inconsistent performance measurement systems- has also been detected. 
In order to mitigate detrimental behaviors to the improvement of organizational 
performance, several recommendations should be considered.  
Performance indicators should reflect both tangible and non-tangible 
resources that affect the policy implementation in an institution. Likewise, 
stakeholders’ interests should be made explicit during the design of indicators by 
using a participatory approach preferably. Moreover, pressure levels associated with 
the accomplishment of tasks and the attainment of specific outputs should be 
controlled strategically (Van Thiel and Leeuw, 2002). 
Other research has also emphasized the need to improve integration between 
performance measures and compensation schemes (Courty and Marschke, 2003). 
Similarly, several scholars have recommended aligning performance programs with 
symbolic recognitions rather than monetary benefits (Heinrich, 2007). It fosters the 
development of an intrinsic motivation without possible side-effects (Frey and Benz, 
2005). Moreover, experts in the performance management field have suggested 
using “enabling controls” for designing performance measurement systems, as such 
controls may increase transparency and flexibility by a multi-player approach 
(Cuganesan et al., 2014; Adler and Borys, 1996; Ahrens and Chapman, 2004). 
According to these experts, “enabling controls” will make people feel less 
constrained by measures and more prompt to improve performance. For instance, in 
2008, a study found that performance measurement systems that involved the 
participation of multiple-stakeholders -during the stages of design and 
implementation- mitigated the emergence of behavioral distortions (Wouters and 
Wilderom, 2008). 
In the same vein, the judgment of performance only based on indicators may 
not reflect the real contributions of people in the whole system, as inherent 
characteristics to social issues (e.g. unpredictability) may not be considered correctly 
(Bosker and Scheerens, 2000). Therefore, making comparisons among players in a 
single system appears to be an obsolescent approach. Perhaps, using dynamic 
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indicators -from a combined institutional and inter-institutional view- may be 
conceived as an insightful answer to improve service delivery and collaboration 
among stakeholders (Bianchi. 2016). 
This thesis proposes the use of the Dynamic Performance Management 
(DPM) as an alternative approach to support the design of consistent performance 
measurement systems aimed at preventing and counteracting the emergence of 
behavioral distortions. In particular, this doctoral research has used the case of the 
Colombian public schools to illustrate the benefits of implementing an outcome-
oriented view in performance management to deal with dysfunctional behaviors. 
2.2) School assessment systems 
2.2.1) Basic notions of school accountability 
In many countries around the world, school accountability is considered a 
central component for the development of government reforms (Levitt et al., 2008). 
Several scholars define school accountability as a system to hold schools and 
teachers accountable for improving educational quality (Ladd, 2007; Hopmann 
2008). In the education sector, the adequate acquisition of knowledge and skills is 
often operationalized by measuring student performance in standardized tests. The 
measurement of this output is highly related to reward mechanisms that look for an 
improvement in the service delivery by fostering positive individual and institutional 
efforts (Booher-Jennings, 2007). 
An important distinction between two types of school accountability models 
has been denoted in the literature (Adams and Kirst, 1999; Firestone, 2002; O’Day, 
2002; Garmannslund et al., 2008; Levitt et al., 2008). On the one hand, external 
accountability models -also known as bureaucratic accountability- are used to 
provide information about 1) the quality and the efficiency in service delivery, 2) the 
compliance of formal regulations set by the government, and 3) the use of financial 
resources. The main characteristic of these models is their top-down approach by 
which education service is subjected to measurement and control by national, 
regional and local agencies. In this category, formal authorities often use 
standardized tests to track student progress in public schools, and they allocate 
financial incentives based on scores. On the other hand, internal accountability 
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models are grounded on the idea that the education service should not be ruled 
through hierarchical divisions. Instead, schoolteachers should be made accountable 
by how they develop their professional commitments according to the opinions of 
other colleagues. This implies the use of a bottom-up approach by which the 
teaching practice relies on the criteria of experienced teachers that have already 
worked in similar contexts. Therefore, internal accountability models connect 
compliance of formal regulations with professional standards and codes of conduct, 
which are evaluated by professional associations and peer review mechanisms. 
International organizations -such as the World Bank- support the implementation of 
internal accountability models in public schools since these models are seen as 
feasible answers to deal with the deterioration of the education service in 
underdeveloped economies (World Bank 2006; World Bank 2017). 
Assessment and Evaluation are widely conceived as synonymous terms, 
however experts in the educational field emphasize their differences. School 
assessment implies the collection of statistical data for making decisions on how to 
enhance the achievement of student learning goals. On the other hand, school 
evaluation implies the examination of procedures, curricula and materials aimed at 
supporting the delivery of a high-quality service (Harlen, 2007). Hence, while 
inspections belong to the evaluation category, the standardized tests belong to the 
assessment category. 
The inspections should be seen as a complement to the standardized tests. 
Both evaluation and assessment methods gauge the achievement of learning 
outcomes through quantifiable outputs. The main difference between them is the 
extent and character of the measurements. The standardized tests are often 
administered at a national and regional level, while school inspections are more 
localized. The former allows policy makers to have a “whole picture” of school 
performance in a broad context through the identification of large-scale patterns. The 
latter provides a “local picture” of how public schools deliver the education service by 
taking into account their contextual factors. Moreover, the standardized tests are 
grounded on objective and consistent elements, while the inspections have a 
subjective character. Therefore, inspection mechanisms may be disproved by 
teachers, however such mechanisms can put in context the adopted indicators 
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through comprehensive judgments that reflect the intrinsic nature of the system 
where the schools perform their activities (Altrichter and Kemethofer, 2015). 
In the category of school assessments, the literature distinguishes between 
two types of tests. They are norm-referenced and criterion-referenced. The former is 
used to compare learning accomplishment levels among students, while the latter is 
used to contrast the achievement of student outcomes with educational standards 
set by the government (Popham, 2003). Both type of assessments can also be used 
to measure the effectiveness of internal school policies and teaching strategies 
through individual data that reflects the acquisition of knowledge and skills by the 
students over time (Vaishnav, 2005). A further distinction between high- and low- 
stake assessments is found in the literature. High-stake assessments imply that the 
standardized tests are used to foster behavioral and instructional changes to 
improve school performance. To this end, rewards and sanctions are allocated 
among schools, teachers and even students depending on the scores got in national 
and international tests (Ryan, 2004; Haertel and Herman, 2005). On the other hand, 
low-stake assessments lack compensation schemes aimed at addressing 
institutional efforts in a particular direction. They have an informative character and 
they are administered in a periodic base without affecting street-level bureaucrats 
directly (Klein et al., 2000; Carnoy et al., 2003; Jacob, 2005). 
Formative and summative assessments have also been discerned in the 
literature (EPPI, 2002; Harlen, 2007). Formative assessments are mainly used by 
schoolteachers to identify learning gaps and adjust teaching strategies. These 
assessments use a holistic approach to track student progress in particular topics 
that have been taught during classes. On the other hand, summative assessments 
involve the achievement of learning goals set by the government, which enables 
students to advance in the next stages of the education system (OECD, 2005).  
Standardized tests belong to this category. The main characteristic of such tests is 
its homogeneity in the design and implementation. This implies that conditions for 
administration, questions, scoring rules and interpretations must be objective and 
consistent to make reliable comparisons among schools and students (Zucker, 2004; 
Popham, 1991). Traditionally, the standardized tests have been used as a tool to 
track progress on academic achievement. 
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Cultural and social factors influence the choice of school accountability 
systems (Bracci, 2009; Darling-Hammond, 2004). This implies that policymakers 
may decide whether to 1) measure certain outputs and outcomes (e.g. family 
involvement, teacher-student ratio, the number of students per classroom, 
graduation and dropout rates), and 2) use particular assessments or evaluation 
methods (e.g. holistic activities, standardized tests, inspections) depending on the 
needs and goals of a community. For instance, the American and Colombian 
education system strongly rely on standardized tests and external controls to hold 
schools accountable for student performance, while the Finnish education system 
relies on formative assessments to enhance both pedagogical processes and 
student learning (Kupianinen et al., 2009). Likewise, Finnish schools have 
discretionary power and independency to design and administer their own curricula 
and assessments -in accordance with national regulations- to enhance educational 
quality (Niemi et al., 2016). This implies that teaching practices are performed in a 
supportive and free environment, which fosters the development of instructional 
methods aimed at satisfying special needs of school students. This endeavor is 
supported by an extensive use of student portfolios, self-evaluations and learning 
feedbacks (Finnish National Board of Education, 2004; Rinne et al., 2002; 
Hendrickson, 2012).  
In particular, this doctoral thesis has mainly been focused on analyzing 
behavioral distortions from the use of school assessment systems. In this regard, the 
design of any test-based accountability system must consider the following elements 
(Hamilton et al., 2002). 
• Goals: These are the final outcomes of education (e.g. educational quality, 
civic-mindedness, social awareness). They are usually delineated as 
statements that express individual and organizational desires through 
competency standards. 
• Measures: These are performance indicators that quantify the goals (e.g. 
scores in the standardized tests, graduation and drop-out rates). Therefore, it 
is indispensable that measures are correctly aligned with standards. 
• Targets: These are school benchmarks designed to compare the current state 
of the system with a desired level. They are usually set on an annual basis. 
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• Incentives: These are positive or negative consequences that result from the 
ability of public schools to attain targets. 
2.2.2) History of test-based accountability systems 
Over the last decades, test-based accountability systems have widely been 
used to hold schools and teachers accountable for improving educational quality. 
Regardless the geographical context, these systems often share similar principles 
such as the allocation of rewards and sanctions aimed at fostering individual and 
organizational changes. However, their design and implementation may substantially 
differ depending on intrinsic factors (e.g. political agenda, institutional norms, 
relationships among stakeholders). Therefore, student assessments may also reflect 
political and economic interests from a local community (Kellaghan et al., 2009). 
The measurement of educational quality has been influenced by the 
development of sophisticated testing systems that may produce valid and reliable 
results (McDonnell, 2005). According to Hamilton et al. (2002), test-based 
accountability systems are a set of methods designed to allocate benefits and 
punishments -to schools, teachers and students- based on test scores. Such tests 
are usually administered in regional, national and international domains. Moreover, 
in an organizational level, high-performing schools may receive financial benefits and 
public recognition, while low-performing schools may be intervened or closed. In an 
individual level, high-performing students may receive rewards such as scholarships, 
while low-performing students may be retained in a particular school grade. These 
exams are mandated by the government, and they are designed by external parties 
to the schools (e.g. private companies). These tests are also characterized by having 
a homogenous format in the questions, conditions for administration, and scoring 
rules. However, such homogeneity does not imply the use of a particular type of 
question (e.g. multiple choice, essay writing) or type of test (e.g. norm-referenced, 
criterion-referenced). 
Using large-scale tests and incentives to improve school performance dates 
back to the mid-1800s (Tyack, 1974). However, these tests became popular since 
the 20th century (Haertel and Herman, 2005). In the USA, the state of New York was 
a pioneer in the implementation of large-scale testing in public schools. This state 
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used test-based accountability systems, before their popularity grew up (Allington 
and McGill-Franzen, 1992). One of the first standardized tests, that was 
administered to high school students in 1923, was the Stanford Achievement Test 
(SAT-10). The purpose of this exam was to assess the effectiveness of educational 
programs and compare schools (Resnick, 1982). In the mid-1920s and the 1930s, 
the use of these assessments increased rapidly because they were conceived as a 
cornerstone in the development of education reforms (Haney, 1981). 
Posteriorly, between the 1940s and the late 1950s, the standardized tests 
were mainly used to judge school curricula and assess organizational performance 
(Goslin, 1963; Goslin et al., 1965). Tests were not used yet to hold schools and 
teachers accountable for student achievement. Likewise, incentives were not 
allocated based on test scores. However, the function of these assessments started 
to change over the years. 
In the 1960s, the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) was 
introduced. This was a periodic test that measured academic achievement in a 
representative sample of American students. Parallelly, the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was released, and compensatory education 
programs were implemented. In this period, the standardized exams were used as a 
mechanism to test the effectiveness of government compensations allocated to 
students with socio-economic disadvantages. According to some scholars, this was 
a step ahead in the use of standardized tests to support school accountability 
(Airasian, 1987; Roeber, 1988).  
In the 1970s, the “minimum-competency movement” emerged as a model to 
determine whether a student had acquired the basic skills to be promoted to the next 
educational stage (Jaeger, 1982). Therefore, both students and teachers were hold 
accountable for performance, and the notion of testing as a trigger of changes in 
teaching practices appeared (Popham et al., 1985).  
In the 1980s, the “education reform movement” replaced the “minimum-
competency movement”. The former movement surged because of an extended 
concern about educational quality. According to NAEP reports, students were failing 
to acquire the most basic competencies. In addition, performance in American 
schools was lower than other countries, despite the high investments in financial 
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resources. As a result, the format of the tests changed (it was mostly based on 
multiple-choice questions and few writing components), and student results in the 
exams were linked to rewards and sanctions to foster educational progress (National 
Governors’ Association, 1989). 
In the 1990s, a second “education reform movement” came up to deal with the 
criticisms associated with the dysfunctional effects that previous accountability 
systems were causing. A “score inflation effect” was detected because school hours 
were mostly devoted to exam preparations. Likewise, it was observed that the 
curricula were narrowed to focus the teaching practice on the tested subjects. This 
provoked an improvement in test scores, but it was not linked to better outcomes in 
education. During this movement, the concept of benefits and punishments for high- 
and low-performing schools remained the same. However, the design of tests was 
intended to help students achieve learning outcomes, despite teaching was 
inexorably focused on improving scores. Therefore, the tests -that emerged during 
this period- were used to assess higher order thinking skills (i.e. complex skills that 
are required to approach novel situations, such as critical thinking and problem 
solving). In addition, standardized tests were complemented with student portfolios, 
essays and teamwork. In this period, performance standards were often modified to 
satisfy community needs, and consequently, assessments were adapted to support 
such changes. In later years, the main adjustments in test-based accountability 
systems were 1) the participation of students with special needs during the 
administration of standardized tests, and 2) an increase in the contents and 
performance standards that were assessed (Hamilton et al., 2002). 
In 2001, the act of congress No Child Left Behind (NCLB) was released in the 
USA. This provoked a substantial increase in school accountability. Every state was 
mandated to assess their students in reading, mathematics and sciences. Likewise, 
school performance was officially determined by the AYP (i.e. Adequate Yearly 
Progress), which was calculated as a compound measure of students’ test results. In 
addition, rewards and sanctions were allocated based on scores. For instance, high-
performing schools received significant investments for classroom materials and 
their teachers received performance bonuses. Conversely, low-performing schools 
could be closed or be subjected to organizational changes (Figlio, 2005). This act of 
congress was controversial in the academic community since several studies 
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supported the benefits associated with high-stake testing (Jacob, 2002; Figlio and 
Rouse, 2004; Deere and Strayer, 2001), and other studies emphasized the side-
effects of measuring school performance through the standardized tests (Jacob, 
2005; Cullen and Reback, 2006).  
In 2015, NCLB was replaced by Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), whose 
main purpose was to develop a flexible method to support school accountability. 
Therefore, failures of the previous education reform were approached by substantial 
changes in the system of rules (Korte, 2015; Darrow, 2016). 
Nowadays, test-based accountability systems are the main mechanisms to 
track progress in the achievement of learning outcomes by monitoring annual 
improvements in specific outputs. Likewise, an emphasis on aligning competency 
standards with tests has been observed in recent years (Mathis and Trujillo, 2016). 
2.2.3) PISA:  A cornerstone in the development of education policies 
PISA (Programme of International Student Achievement) is one of the most 
popular standardized tests around the world. This exam was designed by the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) to measure students’ 
abilities for solving real-life problems (OECD, 1999). While other standardized tests 
(e.g. IEA, PIRLS and TIMSS) are mainly used to assess student performance in 
common subjects in the school curricula of the participating countries (Breakspear, 
2014), PISA is used to gauge academic achievement through an innovative 
approach. 
PISA results are conceived as a cornerstone in the development of education 
policies since its first administration in 2000. PISA is a comparative assessment that 
is administered every three years to 15-years old students in over 60 countries (e.g. 
the USA, Colombia, Finland, Italy, Russia, China, Indonesia). Each PISA cycle has 
an extension of six years and three exams are performed during this period. The first 
cycle was from 2000 to 2006, and the second cycle was from 2009 to 2015. In 
addition, the exams of each cycle have a different focus on testing domains. For 
instance, in 2000, reading was the main subject of the assessment. Therefore, a 
greater number of questions were devoted to it. In 2003, the attention was 
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concentrated on mathematics, and in 2006, the focus was on science. The same 
pattern was repeated in the second PISA cycle.  
PISA has multiple-choice and open-ended questions that must be completed 
in two hours. Contextual factors are also taken into account by means of a thirty-
minutes questionnaire about learning habits and students’ socio-economic 
conditions. A similar survey must be completed by school managers to provide 
further information on the learning environment, teaching practices and educational 
resources. This information allows policymakers to put into context the measures. 
Hence, competencies -that are relevant for the integral development of citizens- are 
assessed by gauging literacy in mathematics, sciences and reading in students from 
different geographical and social contexts. Posteriorly, results are published through 
league tables, which are often used to support education reforms. The education 
systems of the countries ranked in the first and last positions are regularly named as 
high-performing and low-performing school systems respectively (OECD, 2004; 
Schleicher, 2007). 
Several researchers have claimed that school performance may be improved 
through test-based accountability systems (Carnoy, 2001; Figlio, 2005). However, 
other scholars have associated the use of standardized tests with important 
consequences over street-level bureaucrats and students (Hershberg, 2002; Linn, 
2000; Noble and Smith, 1994; Smith and Fey, 2000). Likewise, the beneficial effects 
of school assessments have also been rejected by some schoolteachers who argue 
that the standardized tests are irrelevant to improve learning outcomes (Shohamy, 
2001). As a result, these assessments have not been implemented in all 
geographical contexts. For instance, Finland is considered a role model in education. 
This country has repeatedly ranked in the first positions in international tests such as 
PISA. However, its main characteristic is an education system that does not depend 
on standardized tests and school rankings (Gavrielatos, 2009). Similarly, in Northern 
Ireland, performance indicators are not used to assess public schools because of the 
possible side-effects that such measures may provoke (Bird et al., 2005; McGinnes 
and Elandy, 2012). 
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2.2.4) Criticisms of using school performance measurement systems 
In the scientific literature, the use of test-based accountability systems and 
school inspections have been associated with the appearance of behavioral 
distortions in public schools (Jacob, 2005; Cullen and Reback, 2006; Figlio and 
Getzler, 2006; Chapman, 2001; Ehren, 2006). De Wolf and Janssens (2007) have 
categorized such behavioral distortions into three categories. 
The first category is related to intended behaviors such as window dressing, 
misrepresentation, fraud and reshaping the test pool (De Wolf and Janssens, 2007; 
Jones et al., 2017). Window dressing consists of planning atypical lessons to satisfy 
inspectors’ criteria. Findings on the topic suggest that this behavior was widely 
spread in England during the late 1990s and the early 2000s (Brimblecombe et al., 
1996; Case et al., 2000; Chapman, 2001; Fitz-Gibbon and Stephenson-Forster, 
1999; Wilcox and Gray, 1996). For example, in 1999, it was documented that 81% of 
British principals accepted that inspectors did not attend to conventional classes, as 
pedagogical methods were deliberately modified (Fitz-Gibbon and Stephenson-
Forster, 1999). This action was executed to improve the chances of a successful 
evaluation in the inspection process. Misrepresentation consists of attempting to 
produce a favorable school image -which is usually distant from reality- during the 
inspection. In the Netherlands, it has been found that some schools included out-
doors activities during the classes, intending to fulfill the minimum number of hours 
per lesson (Ehren, 2006). Fraud implies that schools and teachers adopt behaviors 
out of the system of rules that has been set by an external institution. For instance, 
Jacob and Levitt (2003) detected alterations in test-paper answers in a small 
percentage of schools in Chicago. Reshaping the test pool is a deliberate 
misclassification of low-performing students in the standardized tests or an 
encouragement to push out students who can negatively affect school 
accountabilities. For example, Schiller and Muller (2000) found that an inconsistent 
alignment between standardized tests and incentives may increase the chances of 
pushing low-performing students out of the testing pool. In this regard, research in 
the field suggests that greater school investments in human capital -such as the 
development of professional skills in the staff- may reduce the inclination to reshape 
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the test pool, as teachers may feel more confident to satisfy students’ needs 
(Rustique-Forrester, 2005). 
The second category refers to the emergence of unintended behaviors 
because of both assessments and evaluations. It includes 1) the use of teaching 
methodologies based on conservative rather than new approaches, and 2) narrowing 
the curricula through teaching to the test or teaching to the inspection. These 
distortions may lead to isomorphism in the long-term (De Wolf and Janssens, 2007), 
as schools may be ruled by criteria and parameters that homogenize their teaching 
practices at the expense of innovation (i.e. ossification).  
The third category covers the other side-effects that do not belong to the 
previous classifications. On this subject, Perryman (2007) developed a theoretical 
framework that outlines how the pressure exercised by the inspection process may 
lead to unforeseen consequences in schools due to an increase in principals and 
teachers’ stress levels. This side-effect may deteriorate the achievement of learning 
outcomes in the long-term.  
In particular, a “score inflation” effect in test-based accountability systems has 
been found in the literature (Hamilton et al., 2002; Sturman, 2003; Klein et al., 2000; 
Tymms, 2004). This dysfunctional effect is the result of excessive government 
pressure to improve test scores. Such phenomenon leads schools to adopt 
traditional (notion-based) teaching -rather than holistic education- because of its 
supposed suitability to improve performance in standardized tests. However, this 
approach usually implies allocating more time to exam preparations, narrowing the 
school curricula, and rote learning. On the other hand, holistic education or “project-
based learning” supports the acquisition of higher order thinking skills (e.g. critical 
thinking, problem solving and teamwork aptitudes). Such skills allow students to link 
the concepts learnt by attending traditional classes, and to apply them in real-life 
(Harel and Papert, 1991; Strobel and van Barneveld, 2009; Walker and Leary, 2009). 
Pedulla et al. (2003) observed that some schoolteachers devoted more 
teaching time to the tested contents, despite they know the limitations of notion-
based learning. This was the consequence of high-pressure levels for improving 
performance in standardized tests. In addition, Tymms (2004) and Klein et al. (2000) 
detected an increase in test scores in British and American schools as a result of 
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investing a substantial portion of school hours to train students for the exams. 
Similarly, Sturman (2003) found evidence on teaching to the test in British schools. 
Furthermore, Wiggins and Tymms (2002) carried out a comparative analysis 
between elementary schools in England and Scotland. They observed a greater 
incidence of dysfunctional behaviors from the use of performance measurement 
systems in British schools. This outcome was associated with the use of league 
tables to rank schools in England, which differs from the Scottish context. 
Test-based accountability systems have also made schools and teachers 
prone to game the system by excluding students from the exams (Vasquez Heilig 
and Darling-Hammond, 2008; Darling-Hammond, 1991; Smith, 1986; Allington and 
McGill-Franzen, 1992; Figlio and Getzer, 2002). It has led to a substantial reduction 
in learning opportunities for minority groups -such as Hispanic and African American 
students- whose test scores tend to be lower than white students’ results. In 
particular, the scholars argue that score increases in a testing year may be 
associated with an increase in retention and drop-out rates of the previous year 
(Allington and McGill-Franzen, 1992; Wheelock, 2003; Holmes, 2006). Additional 
research supports this position by claiming that high-stake testing provides greater 
incentives for gaming attitudes, which may lead to a higher number of students being 
retained or even dropping the schools out (Nichols et al., 2006; Clarke et al., 2000; 
Lilliard and DeCicca, 2001; Wheelock, 2003; Roderick et al., 1999). In the same line, 
findings on the topic reveal that students who are retained, are more likely to drop 
out compared to students who are promoted (Heubert and Hauser, 1999; Rumberger 
and Larson, 1998). Schools may encourage low-performing students to abandon 
their studies by enforcing rigid attendance policies, implementing repetitive teaching 
formats, and neglecting special learning needs. Thus, an increase in test scores may 
be observed from reshaping the test pool, which may provoke long-term 
consequences in minority groups whose educational rights may be ignored (Owens 
and Ranick, 1977; Vasquez Heilig and Darling-Hammond, 2008). 
In parallel, some researchers have detected that compensation schemes 
based on merit may induce individualistic behaviors in schoolteachers (Weibel et al., 
2010; Ballou, 2001; Firestone and Pennell, 1993; Kohn, 1986; Pfeffer and Sutton, 
2000), which may be detrimental for building professional networks and improving 
organizational performance in the long-term. Findings on the topic suggest the 
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existence of an inverse relationship between an increase in external incentives and 
the inclination for sharing information and collaborating with others (Heyman and 
Ariely, 2004; Yang and Maxwell, 2011). Therefore, social and professional structures 
in schools may be deteriorated unintentionally by test-based accountability systems. 
Similarly, research in the field suggests that informal networks may affect 
school performance (Siciliano, 2017). This implies that public schools with 
collaborative environments may display a higher level in teachers’ performance 
compared to schools with less supportive environments (Jackson and Bruegmann, 
2009; Pil and Leana, 2009). It represents a challenge for a fair allocation of external 
rewards from the use of test-based accountability systems, as equally talented 
workers may exhibit a lower performance due to contextual factors for which they 
should not be made accountable. 
2.2.5) Recommendations to enhance school assessment systems 
This doctoral thesis is mainly focused on the emergence of behavioral 
distortions associated with the use of school assessment systems. Therefore, this 
section portrays several recommendations - from the scientific literature- on how to 
enhance school performance measures and avoid their common side-effects. They 
are described as follows.  
• Aggregation of cohorts: School performance is often assessed through test 
results in a given year. In the first instance, this action may provoke that 
outstanding schools -which have not been sanctioned in the past- may suffer 
punishments because of out of control circumstances. In the second instance, 
schools below performance targets may use dysfunctional strategies to game 
the system and achieve yearly outputs. Hence, aggregating cohorts over time 
may be an alternative to assess performance without punishing schools for 
annual results. It may also be conceived as a fair method to avoid sanctions in 
schools that are improving their performance consistently, but they are under 
the expected target yet (Figlio, 2005). 
• Aggregation of learning outcomes: Figlio (2005) highlights that schools may 
be induced to narrow their curricula to only teach contents that are assessed 
in the standardized tests if additional subjects are added into the current 
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exams. In order to overcome this unintended effect, it is proposed merging 
distinct learning outcomes into a single indicator (Duncombe and Yinger, 
1998). This action may reduce the attention on specific subjects and increase 
the use of a holistic education in schools. 
• Aggregation of student groups: Several test-based accountability systems are 
designed to track student performance by taking into account ethnicity, socio-
economic conditions and disabilities. This is done as a mechanism to promote 
equity in society, as the performance of minority groups can be followed. 
However, findings suggest that errors in the measurements are related to 
highly heterogenous schools (Kane and Staiger, 2002) because such schools 
may arbitrarily classify potential high-performing students as disables, 
intending to meet targets. Therefore, it is suggested to check whether a strict 
disaggregation of student groups is necessary in all cases in order to avoid 
this effect from the use of indicators (Figlio, 2002a). 
• Broadening the scope of measurement: An adequate design of tests is central 
to enhance school accountability. Figlio (2005) remarks the need of aligning 
benchmarks with standardized tests properly, as it is expected that schools 
adapt their teaching strategies based on the exam structure (Figlio and 
Rouse, 2004; Jacob, 2002). As a result, schools may narrow the curriculum to 
teach specific contents and improve their outputs. Hence, they could receive 
rewards and avoid sanctions based on test scores. For instance, under the 
NCLB act, American schools that were sanctioned could lose a significant 
portion of their Federal Title I aid (Figlio, 2005). In order to cope with this side-
effect, the design of standardized tests should consider broadening the scope 
of measurement by including a wide range of inter-disciplinary topics that 
foster the use of a holistic education. However, Figlio recognizes that an 
increase in the financial budget for education should be planned if this 
recommendation is taken into account. In the same vein, the scholar suggests 
that non-tested measures (e.g. graduation rates, drop-out rates, student 
mobility) are considered to calculate school rankings. 
• Using value-added systems for school assessment. It consists of designing 
indicators that measure school performance based on improvements in an 
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extended time span rather than in a specific year. This system highlights the 
need of assessing the impact of teaching strategies on the achievement of 
learning outcomes. In addition, the use of value-added measures may reduce 
the incidence of dysfunctional behaviors, as pressure for meeting tight annual 
targets is released. However, interpreting results may become complex for the 
general audience because of the intrinsic need of tracking the educational 
strategies that were implemented during the previous years (Figlio, 2005). 
In addition, some researchers assert that compensation schemes should 
consistently be adhered to test-based accountability systems (Stiefel et al., 2005). 
This implies that both incentives and performance measures should reflect 
individual, institutional, and inter-institutional interests. In this regard, Siciliano (2007) 
argues that the effect of external rewards on internal competition and the influence of 
collaborative settings on individual performance should be conceived as central 
components in the design of school reward systems. 
The emergence of dysfunctional behaviors in organizations is inherently 
associated with the intertwine between accountability systems and compensation 
schemes. Under certain circumstances, meeting annual targets may induce schools 
to behave improperly. However, it may partially be mitigated by rewards and 
sanctions that discourage such behavior. For instance, the American government 
compensates public schools by the foreseen number of disable students rather than 
the current number. This implies that misclassifying regular students as disables in 
order to meet targets in accountability systems may increase school expenses in the 
long-term, as it must be demonstrated that their special needs are effectively 
covered (Figlio, 2005). Thus, an independency between the standardized tests and 
the reward mechanisms in terms of their system of rules may contribute to a 
reduction of dysfunctional behaviors in public schools. 
In parallel, a growing concern about enhancing higher order thinking skills 
(e.g. critical thinking, academic engagement and collaboration) in school students 
has been observed. In particular, it has been found a positive correlation between 
the use of school practices oriented to develop inter-personal and intra-personal 
abilities and an increase in graduation and college entrance rates, compared to 
traditional teaching formats (Rickles et al., 2019). Likewise, students who have 
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received a holistic education, have been associated with higher levels of competency 
in learning domains that require the application of basic notions in novel situations 
(National Research Council, 2012). In the same line, previous research in the field 
suggests that students who have been enrolled in schools that foster deeper learning 
opportunities -through inter-disciplinary projects, student portfolios, advisories, 
internships and technology integration- have improved their 1) grade point average 
(Collins et al., 2013), 2) test scores (Nichols-Barrer and Haimson, 2013), 3) college 
readiness (Friedlaender et al., 2014), and 4) non-cognitive skills (Collins et al., 2013; 
Guha et al., 2014).  
As a result, enhancing student achievement through a strategic alignment 
between traditional and holistic education may represent an alternative approach to 
build basic notions and higher order thinking skills to 1) overcome modern 
challenges, 2) succeed in civic life, and 3) reduce learning gaps among pupils with 
different socio-economic backgrounds (Rickles et al., 2019). Therefore, an outcome-
oriented perspective in designing school assessment systems is crucial. This 
doctoral thesis proposes the use of Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) as 
an outcome-oriented approach to outline assessment systems in public schools. 
2.3) Educational quality 
The concept of educational quality is a matter of debate because of its 
complex nature. Some experts in education have declared that educational quality is 
the resource that allows children and youth to gain skills and abilities to overcome 
the modern challenges (Marquès Graells, 2001). Others assert that educational 
quality results from a pedagogical process by which organizational interests are 
aligned with student needs. Therefore, the education should 1) foster the 
development of students’ skills, 2) provide schoolteachers with tools that support 
their teaching activities, and 3) encourage families to take part in the learning 
process of their children (Mestres i Salud, 2004). In the same vein, other scholars 
argue that the school education can only achieve a high-quality level if 1) it is 
designed to satisfy the demands and requirements of key stakeholders in a social 
system, and 2) the learning goals can be achieved satisfactorily (Escudero Muñoz, 
2003). Escudero Muñoz also denotes that educational quality should be promoted by 
a sociocultural approach that maximizes the resources to deliver it, and guarantees a 
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wide access to education. Similarly, Schmelkes (1995) affirms that an ideal 
education system should provide students with an easy-access to educational 
resources. Likewise, it should be designed to enhance student achievement by 
fostering innovation and transformation in an individual and institutional level. Such 
transformation may be supported by the participation of families in school activities, 
which may stimulate an active learning environment. 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2005) 
defines educational quality as a final outcome of school activities. Therefore, these 
activities should be designed and assessed carefully to enhance student learning. 
Likewise, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2010) 
describes educational quality as an ex-post concept to determine the potential 
contributions of students in their social system if they acquire an adequate level of 
higher order thinking skills. In the Colombian context, the Colombian Ministry of 
National Education (2013) has delineated educational quality through competency 
standards that allow policymakers to determine whether schools have achieved the 
minimum performance targets. Such competency standards are aimed at comparing 
the current state of the system with a desired goal. Hence, performance is measured 
across different school levels (i.e. pre-school, elementary, and secondary) in the 
subjects that students are expected to learn (i.e. language, mathematics, sciences 
and civic competences). 
Competency standards are conceived as a guide to determine the type and 
quality of education that students may access in a given country. These standards 
support the adoption of instruments, techniques and methods to assess individual 
and organizational capabilities to achieve learning goals. This implies that 
competency standards represent the baseline to design curricula, school projects 
and teaching methodologies. In addition, competency standards set common criteria 
for both assessments and evaluations. For instance, standardized tests -that are 
aligned with competency standards- can be used to 1) monitor student progress over 
time, and 2) design teaching strategies focused on enhancing educational quality. 
Moreover, test results can be complemented with inspection processes to enhance 
performance by taking into account the socio-economic conditions where schools 
operate (Colombian Ministry of National Education, 2013; Cajiao, 2008). 
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The Synthetic Education Quality Index is used in Colombia to measure 
educational quality through four dimensions of performance (Zambrano, 2015). They 
are described below. 
• Progress: It determines how much a school has improved its performance 
compared to the previous year. The main component to be tracked in this 
dimension is the change in the percentage of students who are in the lowest 
performance level in the standardized tests. The weight of this dimension in 
the final score is four points as a maximum. 
• Performance: It discloses the average score in the subjects of mathematics 
and language that has been gotten by the students in the standardized tests. 
The higher the average test score, the higher the score in this dimension. The 
weight of this dimension in the final score is four points as a maximum. 
• Efficiency: It denotes the proportion of students who are promoted to the next 
school level at the end of the year. The weight of this dimension in the final 
score is one point as a maximum. 
• School environment: It is used to measure both classroom conditions and the 
relation between teacher and student.  In order to quantify the variables of this 
dimension, a socio-economic questionnaire must be completed by the 
students after taking the standardized tests. The specific criteria to assess the 
school environment are not revealed by the Colombian Ministry of National 
Education. The weight of this dimension in the final score is one point as a 
maximum. 
According to the Colombian Ministry of Education, this performance 
measurement system is designed to foster a balanced improvement in the four 
dimensions intended to gauge educational quality. Therefore, if a school devotes the 
organizational efforts to the enhancement of a specific dimension at the expense of 
the others, then its Synthetic Education Quality Index will not reflect an optimal 
result. 
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2.4) Description of the Colombian education system 
The Colombian education system has a decentralized profile and its goal is to 
ensure the fundamental right of education to children and youth in the country. This 
system implies the existence of a sectoral organization where each government level 
has competences and complementary responsibilities to improve the service 
delivery. At the national level, the Colombian Ministry of Education develops policies 
and targets, establishes rules, regulates the education service, and tracks 
evaluations. It also provides public schools with technical and administrative help to 
strengthen their management capacity, and it allocates financial resources based on 
specific criteria. At the local level (i.e. departments and municipalities), the education 
secretaries manage the service by leading, planning, supervising and managing 
physical, human, and financial resources. They are also responsible for the results in 
terms of educational coverage and educational quality. Moreover, they provide public 
school with technical help, carry out teacher trainings, and apply rewards and 
sanctions (Codesocial, 2009).  
The Colombian school system consists of the following academic levels.  
• Pre-school: It is made up of three sub-levels. Pre-kindergarten, garten and 
transition. Children usually start this academic level when they are between 
three and six years old. The aim at this stage is to properly develop cognitive, 
social and emotional skills in children (Codesocial, 2009). 
• Elementary school: It is made up of five grades. Children are usually between 
seven and eleven years old during this academic level. The aim at this stage 
is to build basic knowledge in languages, mathematics, sciences and civic 
competences (Codesocial, 2009). 
• Secondary school: It is made up of six grades. Youth are usually between 
twelve and seventeen years old during this academic level. The main 
objectives at this stage are to 1) reinforce the notions that have been 
developed in the elementary school, 2) build higher order thinking skills to 
provide students with tools for overcoming novel challenges, and 3) prepare 
youth for their university careers or their inclusion in the market force 
(Codesocial, 2009). 
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According to the Colombian constitution, the education is a fundamental right 
for children and youth, and its effective delivery is a shared responsibility among the 
major social stakeholders (i.e. government, schools, families and enterprises). The 
Colombian constitution states that every student in the country must receive a high-
quality education, regardless of his/her age, gender, race, religion, or economic 
condition. Public education in Colombia is mandatory and tax-free for children and 
youth between five and fifteen years old. In addition, The Colombian Ministry of 
Education allocates financial resources to the education secretaries based on annual 
percentages that are defined in political agendas. These resources must be used to 
1) pay the salaries of schoolteachers and administrative staff, 2) finance the 
purchase of educational materials, and carry out maintenance and reparation 
activities, 3) support the development of school projects, and 4) provide low-income 
students with meals (Torres and Duque, 1994). 
The four major laws that regulate the Colombian school system are described 
below. 
•  Law 2277 of 1979: It outlines the payment schemes and the conditions for 
promoting teachers that have worked in public schools before 2002 (The 
constitution of Colombia, 1991). 
• Law 115 of 1994: It describes the pedagogical guidelines that public schools 
must follow to deliver the education service effectively (The constitution of 
Colombia, 1991). 
• Law 715 of 2001: In the first instance, it defines the tasks and responsibilities 
for which the national government and the local authorities are made 
accountable. In the second instance, it denotes the financial mechanisms that 
the government uses to support the service delivery (The constitution of 
Colombia, 1991). 
• Law 1278 of 2002: It outlines the payment schemes and the conditions for 
promoting teachers that have worked in public schools after 2002 (The 
constitution of Colombia, 1991). 
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The Colombian Education System has four key actors: families, schools, 
government, and enterprises (Herrera Santana, 2007). An effective collaboration 
among such actors may generate behavioral changes in students in order to properly 
face the challenges in modern societies. Therefore, local agencies should perform 
their functions in a coordinated way to achieve important outcomes for society. 
Unfortunately, at present, the efforts of Colombian educational actors are not 
addressed towards the same path. First, the families are absent in the education 
process. Second, the link that should connect families, society, government, and 
business does not exist in practice (Llinás, 1995). These problems are caused by a 
fragmental and static approach in designing education policies in Colombia. 
Therefore, an outcome-oriented view in performance management is proposed in 
this research to outline such education policies through a holistic and dynamic 
perspective. 
2.5) Standardized tests in Colombia: Background and type of assessments 
In Colombia, state evaluations are designed by the Colombian Institute for the 
Promotion of Higher Education and monitored by the Ministry of Education. The 
standardized tests that are used to assess the Colombian schools are called 
“SABER” and “ICFES”. The former is aimed at verifying the progress in mathematics, 
language, sciences and civic competences of the students who are in the third, fifth, 
ninth grade of the education system. The latter is aimed at assessing a 
comprehensive knowledge acquisition by eleventh grade students before their 
entrance to the university system (ICFES, 2010). The format used in these tests is 
based on multiple-choice questions with single answers. Students must read a 
passage, interpret the information and select the most appropriate answer for the 
questions (ICFES, 2017a, 2017b). This format assumes that students carry out a 
logic process to reach the correct answer. In addition, the Colombian government 
has also administered international tests -such as PISA (Programme for International 
Student Assessment) and TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
Study)- in public schools. These tests have been used to analyze the state of the 
education system by taking into account the socio-economic background where the 
Colombian schools operate (Cajiao, 2008). 
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The use of standardized tests is a recent practice in Colombia. Fernández 
Gómez (2005) states that ICFES has been administered in Colombia since 1968 in 
order to assess student achievement at the end of secondary school. Likewise, the 
scholar declares that SABER was first administered to a small group of Colombian 
schools in the 1990s. In order to ensure the reliability of the data collected by this 
standardized test, a representative sample was built. Schools from Bogota, 
Barranquilla, Cali and Medellin were chosen, as they were located in the most 
important cities of the country. This pilot test was successful. In the first instance, the 
participating schools received feedback to improve their pedagogical methodologies. 
In the second instance, the government could get a whole picture of how schools 
were performing their tasks to set the basis for future education reforms. Posteriorly, 
SABER started to be administrated in a large-scale, and it acquired a mandatory 
character for schools across the country since 2001. Language, mathematics, 
sciences and civic competences are the main knowledge areas to be assessed in 
this exam, as they are assumed to develop students’ skills and aptitudes to 
overcome real-life problems. Nowadays, standardized tests are a cornerstone for the 
development of public policies in the Colombian education sector (Fernández 
Gómez, 2005). 
Colombia’s participation in TIMSS and PISA has strengthened institutional 
efforts to enhance educational quality. A brief description of their administration in 
Colombian schools is provided below. 
TIMSS was first administered to the Colombian schools in 1995. The main 
goal of this test is to determine the mastery level in mathematics and sciences that 
students from all over the world have gained over the years. In addition, this test 
assesses the level of congruence between the school curricula set by the 
government, and the contents that are really taught in the classrooms. This exam 
has successfully been administered to students who are in the third, fourth, seventh 
and eighth grades of the Colombian education system. Relevant information for 
policy making has resulted from the analysis of this test. For instance, it was 
revealed that only 60% of the Colombian public schools consistently taught the 
curricula that were set by the Ministry of Education. In addition, only one third of the 
contents were mastered properly by the students. TIMSS results have also 
emphasized the need to improve the education service promptly, as the Colombian 
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students have repeatedly had low performance levels compared to students from the 
other participating countries (Fernández Gómez, 2005). 
PISA was first administered to the Colombian schools in 2006. The main goal 
of this test is to assess student performance in mathematics, reading, and sciences. 
At this time, over 70 countries around the world take part in this exam. Whereas 
TIMSS is focused on the assessment of the contents that are taught in the 
classrooms, PISA makes emphasis on the assessment of students’ skills and 
abilities to solve novel problems (e.g. assertive communication, critical thinking and 
problem-solving). PISA results are published by means of league tables, which allow 
decision makers to make comparisons among the participating countries and design 
education policies intended to enhance educational quality. Historically, Colombian 
students have had insufficient performance in this test, which has raised multiple 
concerns on how to improve this issue. Therefore, several assessment methods and 
education reforms have been designed in Colombia to increase student 
achievement. In particular, competency standards have been introduced to address 
teaching efforts towards the attainment of both outputs and outcomes (Colombian 
Ministry of Education, 2013). This implies that outcome-oriented methodologies (e.g. 
Dynamic Performance Management) intended to outline school performance 
measurement systems may represent a central component to enhance educational 
quality.  
In Colombia, two types of assessments are mostly used to track student 
progress. They are explained below.  
In the first instance, summative assessments are administered to measure 
performance through a benchmarking process. These assessments are used to 
compare student achievement with pre-defined learning targets. Serie of exams are 
periodically applied to determine whether students are promoted to the next 
academic level based on their scores (Scriven, 1996). In Colombia, summative 
assessments are usually administered through both internal and external 
approaches. From an internal approach, schools are free to measure student 
progress through exams that are designed by a board of teachers. These exams use 
specific performance criteria -which have been set by the schools- to assess the 
competencies of their students. From an external approach, the Colombian Ministry 
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of Education and the Colombian Institute for the Promotion of Higher Education 
design standardized tests (i.e. SABER and ICFES) that are administered in a large-
scale. This type of assessment provides politicians and principals with crucial 
information to outline policies and strategies intended to positively affect school 
efforts towards the delivery of a high-quality service (Cajiao, 2008). 
In the second instance, formative assessments are used to help students in 
their learning process through assignments, projects and other school activities. 
Whereas summative assessments have a direct implication on students’ promotion 
and retention rates, formative assessments only have a pedagogical impact because 
they are used as diagnosis tools to examine students’ knowledge acquisition from an 
individual perspective (Camperos, 1984).  
In particular, the Colombian case -analyzed in the fourth section of this thesis- 
illustrates the emergence of behavioral distortions from the use of performance 
measurement systems that rely on summative assessments to gauge school 
outcomes. 
2.6) Opinions on the use of standardized tests 
Fernández Gómez (2005) states that standardized tests have become a 
cornerstone in Colombian education reforms since the last years. Test-based 
accountability systems have been used to support the enhancement of the education 
service. In particular, compensation schemes based on test-scores have 
represented a key component in such accountability systems, as they have been 
used to foster individual and organizational efforts towards the attainment of school 
outcomes. This scholar is in favor of using standardized tests to measure and track 
student achievement. He argues that standardized tests allow principals and 
schoolteachers to 1) know the competencies that students have gained over the 
years, and 2) develop school programs to reinforce strengths and mitigate 
weaknesses in the learning process.  
On the other hand, Fernández Gómez also recognizes that misinterpretations 
of test results and ignorance of test limitations may deteriorate school performance 
in the long-term. For instance, comparisons among public schools -which have 
opposite social and economic backgrounds- are a common problem of using league 
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tables improperly. Therefore, this researcher provides several recommendations to 
better use standardized tests. In the first instance, he declares that these exams 
should only compare schools that operate in similar contexts. In the second instance, 
he recommends that schools do not adjust the teaching contents to the standardized 
tests. Instead, he suggests that enhancing performance in the standardized tests be 
conceived as a mean, rather than an end, in the learning process. In the third 
instance, Fernández Gómez stresses the importance of improving the quality of 
formative assessments by holistic activities (e.g. interdisciplinary projects and 
advisories). In the fourth instance, he advocates for a higher collaboration between 
principals and schoolteachers to identify student weaknesses and perform 
counteracting actions. Last, the scholar draws the attention to the government to 
design effective policies for enhancing equity and educational quality. To this end, he 
suggests that 1) school performance is not judged by standardized tests, as the 
impact of students’ socio-economic background in test scores is difficult to be 
measured, 2) decisions based on league tables are avoided because school 
rankings promote unfair competency, and 3) reward allocation does not mostly 
depend on test scores since negative consequences might be expected. 
Some scholars have also emphasized how test-based accountability systems 
may provoke relevant side-effects, which have the potential to weaken educational 
quality. For instance, the use of league tables and compensation schemes based on 
test-scores may provoke irregular behaviors intended to reduce performance gaps 
and increase the allocation of individual rewards (Hamilton et al., 2002; Bosker and 
Scheerens, 2000; Brown, 2005). In a similar vein, Popham (2001) asserted that an 
improper use of the standardized tests may trigger consequences for the service 
delivery, such as investing a disproportionate time in exam preparations at the 
expense of other school activities. As a result, a score inflation effect may be 
expected. Therefore, scores may not reflect a real improvement in learning 
outcomes. Moreover, in the Colombian education system, bonus payments, public 
recognition and prioritization in the allocation of financial resources are some 
rewards that teachers and schools receive based on test results (See appendix A). 
In this regard, Lin (2000) declares that test-based accountability systems have lost 
reliability because their main components (i.e. standardized tests and incentives) 
have been associated with detrimental effects. 
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Hamilton et al. (2002) describe the most common behavioral effects that may 
emerge in public schools because of government pressure to increase performance 
in standardized tests. In the first instance, narrowing the school curricula to only 
teach the contents that might be assessed in the exams. In the second instance, 
increasing exam preparations to raise the chances of better results. And in the third 
instance, mimicking the format of the assessments to boost student confidence 
during the administration of national and international tests. 
The measurement of school performance through standardized tests may 
represent a danger to the education system because these assessments rarely take 
into account the environment where the students develop their learning process 
(Martínez Rizo, 2010). This scholar argues that tests do not reflect how results were 
achieved, as contextual factors and pedagogical methodologies are not gauged 
properly. He also declares that the extended use of standardized tests is strongly 
linked to political interests. The enhancement of community outcomes, such as 
educational quality, represents a priority in any government plan. Therefore, 
transparency in accountability and adequate management of the education service is 
crucial. Standardized tests are a mechanism to satisfy these social demands. 
However, in the Colombian education system, the key actors usually have a 
poor assessment culture, which leads to oversize the scope of the tests (Martínez 
Rizo, 2010). These exams are used as an absolute method to determine educational 
quality. In particular, policy makers disproportionately rely on them to design 
education reforms. As a result, ineffective policies are implemented in the schools, 
as decisions are made by using an approach that mostly measures students’ 
knowledge acquisition through exams. This implies a prioritization of summative over 
formative assessments, and therefore student achievement is narrowed to test 
scores. Instead, Martínez Rizo argues that standardized tests should be seen as a 
complement to the teaching strategies because learning goals should only be 
measured by competent teachers who have tracked student progress during a 
relevant period. 
 Perhaps, two of the major limitations to implement Martínez Rizo’s position 
are, in the first instance, that teachers with experience in designing high-quality 
formative assessments are required. Therefore, investments in human capital to 
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enhance teachers’ skills in this field should be a priority. In the second instance, the 
use of formative assessments for external comparisons would imply to design new 
strategies for quantification and data aggregation, as formative assessments are 
intended to only measure students’ knowledge acquisition in the classroom.  
To sum up, positive and negative effects can be experienced from the use of 
standardized tests. In order to reinforce the positive effects, tests should be seen as 
an opportunity to support student learning. Likewise, this type of assessment should 
be used to make an early diagnosis of students and schools in risk, which also 
requires a greater support from the Ministry of Education. The identification of 
strategic resources, performance drivers and end-results -through an instrumental 
view of DPM- is proposed in this thesis to shed light on how to enhance school 
performance measurement systems. This is done for the purpose of pursuing 
sustainable outcomes in the long-term such as an improvement in educational 
quality. 
2.7) Design of control systems in organizations 
The design of control systems should take into account the context where the 
organizations operate (Flamholtz, 1983). This implies that a pre-defined set of 
targets and managerial procedures may not guarantee a successful policy 
implementation. In order to address efforts towards the achievement of community 
outcomes, a wider perspective in designing control systems is required. Policy 
makers often emphasize the need for monitoring, evaluating and adjusting actions to 
meet targets. Likewise, they regularly conceive the allocation of incentives as a 
natural consequence of individual and organizational performance. In the scientific 
literature, this detailed group of procedures and routines is named as core control 
system (Flamholtz, 1983) or diagnostic control system (Simons, 1995). 
According to Flamholtz (1983), the core control system is only one of four 
components that should be considered in the design of organizational control 
systems. Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of such components. 
 
 
  
49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The core control system -represented by the innermost circle- is subdivided in 
the four components that are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first component is the planning system. In this phase, organizational goals 
and strategic view are outlined to determine the steps to improve performance and 
achieve outputs and outcomes.  
Figure 1: Components of organizational control systems (Flamholtz, 1983; Maciejczyk, 2016) 
Figure 2: Components of the core control system (Flamholtz, 1983; Kuhlmann 2012) 
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The second component are the operations. It refers to the tasks and activities 
that are crucial to achieve organizational goals. 
The third component is the measurement system. In this phase, performance 
is gauged through operating results. Likewise, collected data is used to make short-
term adjustments to the operations that are executed. 
The fourth component is the evaluation and reward system. In this phase, 
incentives are allocated to distinct organizational units based on their results. In 
addition, long-term adjustments may also be carried out to redefine both operations 
and goals if necessary. 
The design of control systems should also take into account the organizational 
structure, the organizational culture, and the organizational environment. 
The organizational structure refers to the set of rules that allow the core 
control system to work properly (e.g. the use of a centralized or decentralized 
structure, and the workforce specialization by means of organizational units).  
The organizational culture describes the values and beliefs that govern the 
organization (e.g. the institutional vision and the assumptions associated with the 
managerial processes).  
The organizational environment is the space where the above components 
converge. It also includes the internal and external forces that may affect 
performance (e.g. individual behaviors, management styles, government reforms 
and stakeholders’ pressure).  
Several years after Flamholtz’s research was published, Kaplan and Norton 
(1992) proposed the “Balanced scorecard” as a systematic framework to analyze 
critical performance factors in an organization. Such factors represented the key 
variables that should be monitored and assessed in any diagnostic control system, 
as they were the causes of either success or failure in policy implementation. Before 
the Balanced Scorecard was used in the public and private sector, performance was 
mainly conceived as the result of financial measures (e.g. operating income, return 
on equity, cash flow). Therefore, this framework represented an important change in 
organizational mindsets because the following non-financial measures were also 
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taken into account. Customer measures (e.g. customer satisfaction, market share, 
time delivery) were used to describe performance as a function of market conditions 
and customers’ interests.  Internal process measures (e.g. cycle time, unit-cost, 
capacity utilization rate) were used to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in 
organizational activities. Innovation and learning measures (e.g. training 
effectiveness, employee motivation, time to launch a new product) were used to 
encourage best practices and attitudes among employees. 
Later, Simons (1995) remarked the need of complementing the diagnostic 
control systems -also named as core control systems- with the interactive control 
systems to pursue strategic transformations in public and private organizations. 
In the first instance, Simons was in favor of using the Balanced Scorecard as 
a framework to support the diagnostic control systems by gauging critical 
performance factors. In particular, the measurement of such factors should 1) be 
verifiable, 2) capture relevant behaviors in an organization, and 3) reflect individual 
efforts (Lawler and Rhode, 1976). Unfortunately, control systems rarely meet such 
ideal conditions, and dysfunctional effects tend to emerge as a consequence of 
performance gaps (Simons, 1995). Measuring the wrong variables and relying 
individual performance on external incentives (e.g. financial benefits) are frequently 
the causes of a gap between the current and the desired state of the system. In 
order to reduce this gap, Simons highlighted the importance of conceiving the 
diagnostic control systems as a set of principles and processes that use negative -
also called corrective- feedbacks for enhancing the service delivery. A classic 
example that illustrates how a negative feedback works is the temperature regulation 
in a home by means of a thermostat. If the current temperature is too high compared 
to a desired level, then the thermostat will attempt to reduce it.   
In the second instance, Argyris (1977) and Simons (1995) suggested to shift 
from a single loop learning to a double loop learning. The use of diagnostic control 
systems -based on a single loop learning- implies that mental models, goals and 
performance targets are not questioned. Hence, the methods used in organizations 
to achieve performance targets are not altered. Once the organizational goals are 
set, pre-defined procedures are executed. It makes the organizations perform 
actions with a high level of autonomy and homogeneity, which eliminates the need of 
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communication among stakeholders. However, today’s world is characterized by its 
fluctuating dynamics. It requires a high level of flexibility and innovation to approach 
novel events. In these circumstances, the use of interactive control systems -based 
on a double loop learning- that implies the participation of multiple stakeholders and 
fosters strategic dialogue is essential to review the underlying principles of 
organizational strategies. Therefore, interactive controls systems should also be 
implemented in organizations. 
The interactive control systems embody additional features that complement 
to the diagnostic control systems. In uncertain environments, the design of 
adaptative strategies intended to align forecasts with organizational actions is a 
priority. In these circumstances, interactive control systems represent a powerful 
allied since a focus on processes -rather than pre-defined outputs and outcomes- 
becomes relevant to organizational performance. Likewise, these control systems 
stimulate dialogue and learning in organizations to enhance their operations. 
Moreover, the design of compensation schemes based on diagnostic control 
systems may be easier to manipulate than the design of rewards based on 
interactive control systems, as incentives in the former group are determined by fixed 
measures. Conversely, interactive control systems rely on subjective rewards that 
are allocated according to the superior’s judgments about employees’ performance. 
Therefore, innovative behaviors -which are difficult to quantify by using preset 
indicators- may be taken into account. It may also foster a positive -also called 
reinforcing- feedback based on information sharing among internal and external 
stakeholders (Simons, 1995). 
In a similar vein, Ouchi (1979) argued that three types of control mechanisms 
can be identified and implemented in organizations depending on the clarity and 
congruence between their goals and the adopted measures. Likewise, the scholar 
remarked that no organization will display a pure control mechanism, as they usually 
embody particular characteristics of each type. Such controls are described below. 
The market control is based on norms of reciprocity by which sanctions are 
executed if the parties do not behave properly during the financial transactions. In 
this control mechanism, people are rewarded by their precise contribution to the 
organization, which in turn implies that individual goals may be pursued if a reward 
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reduction is accepted. The market control is appropriate in situations where outputs 
can be identified and measured accurately, such as in economic activities influenced 
by price dynamics (Peterson’s, 2010). 
 The bureaucratic control embodies not only norms of reciprocity, but also a 
legitimate authority that leads the subordinates’ actions towards the achievement of 
organizational goals through a set of rules. Both performance assessment and 
agreement on hierarchical structures are major characteristics in this type of control. 
In addition, rewards are allocated depending on the superiors’ interpretations about 
individual contributions to the organization. This is the most extended control 
mechanism in public and private organizations. 
The clan control uses social agreements based on traditions, shared values 
and beliefs to foster knowledge exchange among people (Tighe, 2019), and to 
encourage individual efforts through limited supervision (Peterson’s, 2010). This 
control mechanism is the most demanding to be implemented because 1) the 
employees’ view should be congruent with the mission and vision of the organization 
beforehand, and 2) the managers should periodically reinforce the internalization of 
values and beliefs among subordinates by ritual and ceremonies (e.g. professional 
training). The clan control is usually used if performance control (Mintzberg, 1979) 
and behavior control (Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990) are not sufficient for the 
attainment of outcomes. In these circumstances, strict selection criteria and high 
levels of socialization are used to promote cooperative mechanisms intended to 
reduce goal incongruence between organization and individuals (Brenner, 2009). 
Thus, the clan control is appropriate in flexible settings where discretionary power is 
central, as different methods may be used to complete an activity. Likewise, it is 
suitable to support the achievement of community outcomes in professional 
bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1979) or street-level bureaucracies (Lipsky, 1980). 
Professional bureaucracies are usually found in contexts where the clan 
control is implemented. They do not depend on formal routines, regular supervisions 
from superiors, and other bureaucratic controls to work correctly. Instead, 
internalization and standardization of values and beliefs are crucial factors that 
ensure a proper service delivery to clients. Therefore, professionals have high 
discretionary power and work autonomously. They are also expected to achieve 
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similar results than in environments where constant audits are the norm (Mintzberg, 
1979). In addition, professional bureaucracies often operate in a decentralized 
setting, which makes it difficult to plan a broad organizational strategy. As a result, 
performance is the product of individual initiatives that are characterized by an 
entrepreneurship spirit (Brock et al.,1999). 
Street-level bureaucracies is a concept that was coined up by Lipsky (1980) to 
denote organizations whose employees have 1) discretionary power in the execution 
of their activities, 2) high level of autonomy from a legitimate authority, and 3) direct 
contact with citizens. In addition, these organizations often work in environments 
where the resources are limited, the demand of services is greater than the offer, 
and the goals are difficult to measure since they are ambiguous. Some examples of 
this type of organizations are schools, hospitals, police departments and tribunals, as 
their representative workers (i.e. teachers, doctors, policemen and judges) can 
decide the quality and the quantity of their contributions to the service delivery. This 
does not imply that street-level bureaucrats operate in a system that lacks rules. On 
the contrary, administrative officials and politicians articulate the standards and 
criteria by which performance is measured and behaviors are controlled. In this 
context, street-level bureaucrats are granted the possibility of pursuing the routes 
they consider most appropriate for the achievement of organizational outputs and 
outcomes. Thus, in a certain way, street-level bureaucrats may also be considered 
as policymakers since they are ultimately responsible for the process of policy 
implementation (Lipsky, 1980). 
In street-level bureaucracies, the employees are usually less supervised than 
in other sorts of settings, as discretion requires freedom to be exercised. In addition, 
standards and indicators are defined in a context where goal ambiguousness is a 
key feature. The above attributes cause the results to be gauged without having 
clarity of the behaviors that were used to achieve them. This implies that quantitative 
measures rarely reflect the rationales by which people are judged because such 
measures do not support the qualitative content of the bureaucrats’ actions 
(Broadkin, 2008). Therefore, a management-by-enabling, instead of a management-
by-incentive, approach is required (Broadkin, 2011; Elmore, 1978; Lipsky, 1980). 
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In particular, several side-effects in street-level bureaucracies (e.g. goal 
conflicts and dysfunctional behaviors) emerge as a consequence of discretionary 
power and autonomy of employees, which hinders organizational controls. This 
condition would make one think that a removal of both attributes would lead to a final 
solution. However, the activities that street-level bureaucrats must perform in public 
and private organizations are complex, and therefore narrowing the job substantially 
or setting rigid rules are not an optimal response. Both approaches are not 
sustainable in the long-term because they cannot anticipate all behavioral scenarios 
that may appear during the execution of activities. For instance, in education, every 
child is different and has distinct learning needs. It makes the use of a detailed 
instructional approach almost impossible to be implemented in all circumstances 
(Lipsky, 1980). This implies that schoolteachers should use their discretionary power 
to decide the best teaching methodologies to apply during classes in order to help 
each student develop his/her skills and abilities.  
The use of an outcome-oriented view in outlining school performance 
measurement systems through DPM is congruent with the ideas above discussed, 
and it allows to pursue sustainable outcomes in the long-term. In this research, the 
characteristics of the Colombian education system -such as a decentralized 
structure, clarity in the distribution of roles and bureaucratic procedures, high respect 
for education authorities, and some degree of flexibility to perform teaching 
strategies in the classroom- have been embodied in the DPM model implicitly. 
2.8) Dynamic Performance Management (DPM): An instrumental view 
DPM is used to frame problems with the use of output-oriented Performance 
Measurement Systems (PMS) in Colombian public schools, and to support the 
design of a robust set of performance measures based on an outcome-oriented 
view. 
In particular, DPM can enhance PMS by trade-off analysis in time and space 
(Bianchi and Williams, 2015). Whereas trade-offs in time emphasize the effects of 
policies on different time horizons, trade-offs in space highlight the effects of policies 
on different subsystems. This distinction can help policy makers to 1) raise 
awareness about relevant delays in the system, 2) contextualize performance 
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measures, and 3) broaden system boundaries through an inter-institutional 
perspective (Bianchi and Rivenbark, 2014). 
Figure 3 shows how DPM can support policy makers to outline sustainable 
policies by linking strategic resources with performance drivers, which in turn 
feedback into strategic resources through end-results. This approach can also 
improve the design of PMS by implementing modeling and simulation techniques. 
DPM charts illustrate strategic resources as tangible and intangible stocks 
(Morecroft, 2007; Warren, 2008) that decision makers can use to develop their 
policies and meet performance targets. The availability of such resources varies 
depending on decision makers’ actions. On the one hand, deliberate decisions (e.g. 
staff hiring) will affect the change of strategic resources that can be obtained from 
the market. On the other hand, the outcomes of the implemented policies (i.e. end-
results) will affect the amount of such resources that cannot be acquired from the 
market (e.g. human capital, trust, image). These end-results are symbolized as flows 
in Figure 3. They accumulate in strategic resources, which are symbolized as stocks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To some extent, strategic resources can be controlled individually. However, if 
an unbalanced growth of them becomes the rule, then organizations will not reach 
their maximum potential. Changes in the strategic resources provide a partial view 
Figure 3: An instrumental view of Dynamic Performance Management (Bianchi, 2010) 
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about DPM. Therefore, critical success factors for achieving the end-results (i.e. 
performance drivers) must also be identified to understand how the system works 
from a holistic perspective. Performance drivers are gauged as ratios between the 
current and the desired state of strategic resources (e.g. the student-teacher ratio 
divided by a benchmark). These drivers should be measured and tracked 
continuously to recognize symptoms of failure and enhance the attainment of end-
results (i.e. outputs and outcomes). Finally, end-results feed back into strategic 
resources and the cycle of performance is repeated (Bianchi et al., 2017). 
Learning in-and-about complex social systems (Sterman, 1994) is possible 
through DPM. In particular, DPM describes organizational performance by making 
explicit the feedback structures, the mental models, and the decisions. This 
approach allows policymakers to deal with symptoms of crisis, such as the side-
effects of an inconsistent design of indicators. For instance, schoolteachers may 
narrow school curricula by only focusing on tested subjects to improve student 
performance in high-stake tests. However, this strategy may be detrimental for the 
achievement of school and community outcomes in the long-term (e.g. educational 
quality, civic-mindedness, social awareness), as notion-based learning is prioritized 
over holistic education. 
In the next section, the research methodology -which was used to analyze the 
case of the Colombian public schools and build the DPM model- is explained in 
detail. 
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3) RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1) Rationale for adopting DPM 
The DPM approach contributes to the enhancement of Performance 
Measurement Systems (PMS) by providing decision makers with effective tools to 
frame how and why indicators change over time for the implemented policies.  
Traditional approaches in performance measurement often lead to a narrow 
and static view in data analysis and reporting, which rarely takes into account how 
targets are achieved. This implies that an output, rather than an outcome, view is 
mostly used to hold public organizations accountable. DPM can support policy 
makers in designing consistent PMS by using modeling and simulation techniques. 
In addition, DPM charts can be used as a framework to foster policy discussion by 
outlining a shared view among multiple stakeholders through the identification of 
strategic resources, performance drivers and end-results. 
Furthermore, DPM can enhance the comprehension of how dysfunctional 
behaviors affect school performance through an outcome-oriented view (Bianchi and 
Williams, 2015). This view is crucial to avoid 1) an illusion of control as a result of a 
linear-thinking (Langer and Roth, 1975), 2) a goal displacement because of an 
inversion between means and ends (De Lancer Julnes, 2006; Sills, 1957), and 3) a 
performance adaptation since people learn how to game the measurement system, 
which causes indicators to lose their capability to differentiate between low- and 
high-performers adequately (Van Thiel and Leeuw, 2002; Meyer and Gupta, 1994). 
In this research, DPM has been used to support the design of outcome-
oriented performance measurement systems intended to prevent and counteract the 
emergence of behavioral distortions in Colombian public schools. To this end, a 
DPM simulation model -which takes into account trade-offs, non-linearities and time 
delays- has been built.  
In particular, in the case-study of the Colombian public schools, a broader 
perspective in school performance measurement systems is needed to 1) extend the 
boundaries of performance indicators from test-scores to an assessment of holistic 
learning outcomes, and 2) align external targets -set by the government- with 
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measures that take into account the socio-economic background where public 
schools operate. An instrumental view of DPM is proposed to implement this 
perspective and pursue the achievement of sustainable outcomes. Thus, 
performance may be affected positively by focusing on end-results (i.e. outputs and 
outcomes), performance drivers and strategic resources. 
3.2) Research design 
A sequential exploratory design was used in this research. This is a type of 
mixed methods strategy that consists of two phases to gather the primary data. In 
this investigation, the first phase involved the collection of qualitative data by means 
of semi-structured interviews and a survey based on open-ended questions mainly. 
The second phase involved the collection of quantitative data by further interviews, a 
second survey based on numerical reasoning, and model validation sessions. 
In addition, the secondary data was collected and interpreted by document 
review. In the first instance, open government data, local newspapers, and school 
performance reports were examined. In the second instance, analysis of the 
scientific literature in the fields of performance management and education was 
carried out. As a result, several simulation parameters were estimated based on 
secondary data (Luna-Reyes and Andersen, 2003). 
In the first stage of this research, a preliminary field study -conducted through 
semi-structured interviews and a survey- was carried out to determine how 
stakeholders in education impact on educational quality (Salazar Rua, 2016). To 
guarantee the participation in this study of the main stakeholders in the Colombian 
Education System (i.e. families, schools, government, and enterprises), a non-
probability sampling was used. 
 The sampling procedure is described below.  
1) Colombian public schools -located in municipalities with different degrees of 
economic development- were chosen to carry out this research. For the 
highest economic development category, schools from Bogota and 
Barranquilla were selected. For the middle economic development category, 
schools from Monteria and Pereira were chosen. For the lowest economic 
  
60 
development category, schools from Sabaneta and Sabanalarga were 
selected. 
2) In the above municipalities, a public school that met the following criteria was 
chosen. They were: 1) a student-teacher ratio and test scores in the national 
average statistics, 2) a medium-sized school, and 3) an educational offer for 
students in all the academic levels (i.e. pre-school, primary school and 
secondary school). A total of six public schools were involved in this stage. 
3) Schoolteachers were asked to fill out a survey based on open-ended 
questions (see Appendix B). In addition, several teachers agreed to be 
interviewed in order to share their experiences. A total of twenty 
schoolteachers completed the survey.  
4) Other stakeholders in education were also involved in this research. In 
particular, the sample included one person responsible to analyze test results 
at the Colombian Institute for the Promotion of Higher Education, two 
representatives from a local enterprise in Barranquilla, and four parents 
whose children study in the participating public schools. 
In the second stage of this research, a survey -based on open-ended 
questions and numerical reasoning- aimed at understanding the effects of 
standardized tests on the behavior of Colombian schoolteachers was administered 
(See Appendix C). In addition, facilitated sessions were performed in a given public 
school, intending to receive further help in the model validation phase. A total of 
three teachers attended the sessions, and twelve teachers filled out the survey. In 
particular, the analysis of the collected data contributed to set the initial values of 
different variables in the DPM model, such as the teaching time allocated to 
traditional teaching and to holistic education, and the time affecting the inflow and 
outflow of the stocks of higher and lower knowledge students. Thus, an experimental 
approach in building the simulation model was implemented. 
This research design was chosen because it was appropriate to 1) answer the 
research questions, and 2) triangulate the data in order to enhance the validity of the 
findings (Saunders and Lewis, 2012). In particular, the information collected -through 
surveys, interviews, school reports, open government data, and model validation 
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sessions- was used to estimate a range of values that performance variables and 
strategic resources would realistically portray in a medium-sized school in the 
investigated region. However, this was an exploratory research, which implies that 
the results should not be generalized since it was used a small sample of individuals. 
3.3) Model building approach 
  Based on a preliminary field study carried out through semi-structured 
interviews with schoolteachers, prior knowledge of the problem context was obtained 
(Salazar Rua, 2016). Colombian teachers perceive the assessment system as a 
potential disadvantage for schools in poor areas. In fact, the assessment system 
does not consider how the socio-economic conditions of the areas where schools 
operate affect performance. In order to cope with this issue, schools have been 
inclined to increase their scores by allocating more teaching time to a narrow range 
of subjects, at the expense of others. As an unintended consequence of this 
unbalanced time allocation, the outcomes have been dropping despite slight 
increases in the scores. The risks of behavioral distortions, caused by such systems, 
require the use of proper methods that help Government design “robust” school 
performance benchmarking frameworks. 
   To start a dialogue with schoolteachers about the factors causing the 
described phenomena, two versions of a DPM model -that point out the interplay 
between strategic resources, performance drivers, outputs and outcomes- were built. 
These versions of the model were focused on the unintended consequences from 
the use of inconsistent performance measurement systems, and on the policy 
recommendations to counteract dysfunctional behaviors.   
  To this end, a focus on an empirical analysis -based on both primary and 
secondary data- was used. An exhaustive literature review, twelve surveys, three 
interviews with Colombian schoolteachers, document analysis, and model validation 
sessions with the support of experienced teachers, were carried out.  
  The model building process followed three steps.  
  In a first step, a problematic behavior was outlined by taking into account the 
literature review. In parallel, a causal loop diagram (CLD) was sketched to frame the 
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feedback structure that describes the emergence of behavioral distortions in public 
schools due to the use of standardized tests. 
  In a second step, a DPM chart was developed to illustrate how the system 
structure -portrayed by the CLD- may support an understanding of the effects of 
myopic education policies on school performance. Two sessions of three hours each 
were carried out to discuss both the CLD and the DPM chart with a group of three 
experienced teachers in a Colombian medium-sized school (about 500 students). 
The sessions raised several suggestions for improvement of both documents. The 
teachers, who attended the two facilitated sessions, were selected based on three 
main criteria: 1) qualification and experience, 2) involvement in school performance 
assessment, and 3) the status of the school, which in this case was of a public 
institution in a poor area of Barranquilla-Colombia.  
In a third step, model structure and behaviors were validated -through group 
and individual meetings- to capture divergent ideas as suggested by Andersen et al. 
(2012). This analysis helped consider new insights, which led to iterative 
modifications in the initial model structure, parameter initialization, and simulation 
time. The validation of the model structure also contributed to test the hypotheses 
embedded in the CLD. In particular, building reliability in the DPM model was a 
gradual process that emerged as a result of the modeling experience during the 
facilitated sessions. Moreover, a qualitative, semi-formal and non-technical process 
was used to assess the usefulness of the simulation model to foster policy 
discussion (Barlas, 1996; Bianchi 2016). 
Modeling strategy and simulation results were portrayed by following “the 
three C’s” (Zhang and Shaw, 2012). Therefore, completeness in data reporting, 
clarity in the process to attain research results, and credibility in such results by 
using a solid scientific reasoning, were central to this investigation (See Appendix D). 
The primary goal of the model was not to replicate a reference mode with 
actual data because such data was not available in detail due to the recent adoption 
of the test-based accountability system in the country. The model was rather 
intended to raise the Colombian teachers’ awareness about the possible unintended 
consequences of policies focused on narrowing curricula to improve standardized 
test performance. 
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3.4) Research outputs: Data 
As a result of the data collection phase, the following research outputs were 
produced.  
• In the first stage of the research, twenty surveys were completed. In the 
second stage of the research, twelve surveys were completed. 
 
• Three interviews with schoolteachers were recorded. Such interviews were 
intended to discuss participants’ points of views and complement the 
information collected through the surveys. 
 
• Over one hundred documents were collected and analyzed throughout this 
investigation. 
 
In the next section, the case of the Colombian public schools is used to frame 
behavioral problems associated with the use of inconsistent performance measures 
through DPM. 
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4) MODELING STRATEGY AND SIMULATION RESULTS 
4.1) Behavioral distortions associated with school assessment systems 
According to the scientific literature, an excessive pressure to improve 
performance in standardized tests has caused the emergence of relevant behavioral 
distortions in public schools (Hamilton et al., 2002). Such distortions are: 1) 
narrowing the school curricula to only focus the teaching practice on tested-subjects, 
2) devoting a large portion of time in exam preparations, and 3) designing classroom 
assessments with a format similar to the standardized tests. These dysfunctional 
strategies may produce a “score inflation effect” -which implies a short-medium term 
increase in test scores but a long-term decrease in them- because higher-order 
thinking skills may not be built appropriately (Fuller, 2004 cited in Center on 
Education Policy, 2009; Linn, 1998; MassPartners for Public Schools, 2005). 
In Figure 4, a causal loop diagram (CLD) outlines the effects associated with 
behavioral distortions in public schools because of perceived low performance ratios 
when static performance measurement systems are used.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4: Impact of government evaluation systems on school policies 
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A perceived low performance ratio may affect how teaching time is allocated in 
public schools. “Students’ knowledge ratio” is the quotient between higher 
knowledge students (i.e. students who have acquired the knowledge and skills to 
approve the standardized tests) and a desired value. If such ratio decreases, 
schoolteachers must face high pressure levels to improve student performance. 
Therefore, in the short-term, an initial increase in the number of higher knowledge 
students (balancing loop “B1”) is perceived because of a “score inflation effect” 
(Hamilton et al., 2002). 
However, the above results are not sustainable in the long-term since less 
time is allocated to pursue outcomes through a “holistic education”. Therefore, a 
reduction in the number of higher knowledge students will be observed, which in turn 
will lead to lower perceived performance ratios (reinforcing loop “R1”). The 
reinforcing loop “R2” shows how a decrease in the student knowledge ratio 
generates a further reduction in the resources that Government allocates to such 
schools. This generates a lack of investments, which would further cause lower 
performance levels in the long-term.  
In brief, if school activities are primarily based on traditional (i.e. notion-based) 
teaching then a significant reduction in the time to build higher order thinking skills 
(e.g. critical thinking, problem-solving, teamwork aptitudes) will be perceived. As a 
result, the number of higher knowledge students will decrease in the long-term 
because the students will not be able to sustain high scores in the exams. Therefore, 
the acquisition of concepts in advanced stages of the student career will also be 
hindered due to a lack of accumulated knowledge. 
4.2) Problems with narrowing the curricula in Colombian public schools 
A DPM approach has been used to model how government evaluation 
systems -mainly focused on test scores and the assessment of traditional teaching 
outputs- led Colombian public schools to narrow the curricula. This situation may 
weaken student learning in the long-term despite of a perception of performance 
improvement in the short-term. 
  Figure 5 illustrates a DPM chart applied to the Colombian case. By following 
a bottom-up sequence, it identifies end-results to understand the impact of 
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behavioral distortions in public schools in the short- and long-term. It also identifies 
performance drivers influencing the accumulation and depletion processes of 
strategic resources. By mapping such resources, it supports an assessment of the 
gaps between the current state and the external targets set by the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A change in higher knowledge students is affected over time by the dynamics 
of the following performance drivers: “% Time allocated to tested subjects” (i.e. 
Number of hours allocated to tested subjects over Total school hours) and “Balance 
and scope of learning” (i.e. Number of hours allocated to tested subjects over Time 
allocation benchmark). Such drivers describe a policy through which a reduction in 
the student knowledge ratio (i.e. Number of higher knowledge students over a 
benchmark) leads to an increase in the time allocated to the tested subjects.  When 
the student knowledge ratio is lower than one, schools react by looking for an 
immediate improvement in test scores. However, in the long-term, the side effects of 
this policy may negatively impact on the previous score gains. In fact, a higher 
fraction of time allocated to a bounded set of tested subjects (in proportion to the 
total teaching time) would increase and worsen the balance and scope of learning. 
Figure 5: Effects of myopic policies aimed at increasing the number of higher knowledge students in 
Colombian public schools 
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This would generate a “score inflation effect”, rather than an improvement in 
student aptitudes and skills. 
In the long-term, also for those students who have initially been successful in 
their test scores, such “surface learning” (Marton and Saljö, 1976a, 1976b) could not 
sustain the achieved level in “higher knowledge students”.  
 Figure 6 shows a DPM simulation model designed to prevent and mitigate 
negative effects of school strategies based on an output-oriented approach. The 
main purpose of this model is to improve the understanding of complex dynamics 
rather than mimicking the behavior of historic time series (Bianchi and Winch, 2006). 
Therefore, the parameters it embodies and the results it generates through 
simulations should not be taken as accurate estimates. Instead, the model can be 
used to develop an understanding of how feedback system structures affect system 
behavior.  
Figure 7 portrays the results from a simulation run of a DPM model based on 
the previously discussed myopic policies. The simulation has been run over a 120-
months’ time horizon (10 years). This time extension has been set to capture the 
unintended side effects of such a policy on students learning outcomes. 
The DPM model illustrates the case of a ‘generic’ medium-sized Colombian 
school in a poor area. This school has 50 students in a given cohort. It will take 10 
more years for the students of such cohort to accomplish their studies. The purpose 
of the model is to portray the risks of poor outcomes related to teaching policies that 
aim at attaining significant improvements in standardized test scores in the short-
term. Such risks may occur due to a bounded capability of students to sustain high 
test scores levels over the years, if only traditional teaching methods are adopted. 
Despite the high level of synthesis used in this model, it was experienced a 
change in schoolteachers’ mindsets on how to attain sustainable goals from their 
efforts to improve standardized test scores. Discussing the model feedback structure 
and behavior with the participants by means of facilitated sessions, enabled them to 
perceive the need of identifying and monitoring the drivers of unintended outcomes 
from myopic education policies. Through the model, teachers could reflect on how 
silent phenomena -caused by the adoption of irrational policies- may generate poor 
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results in the medium-long term (e.g. prioritizing rote learning to the detriment of 
holistic education in order to increase scores in standardized tests). Therefore, 
keeping the time behavior of such performance drivers under constant control may 
help schoolteachers detect early symptoms of unintended and unsustainable 
outcomes of education policies in order to counteract them promptly. 
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Figure 6: A DPM simulation model illustrating the effects of myopic policies aimed at increasing the number of higher knowledge students in 
Colombian public schools 
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The school described by the model has been unsuccessful in the past in 
achieving its targeted level of higher knowledge students: only 20% of total students 
passed the standardized tests. In order to improve performance and pursue a 
significant increase in the fraction of higher knowledge students over the total 
population, the school increases the time allocated to tested subjects. In the 
simulation model the target has been set to 90%, intending to illustrate how 
Figure 7: Results from a simulation run illustrating the effects of myopic policies aimed at increasing 
the number of higher knowledge students in Colombian public schools 
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Colombian schools in poor areas may emotionally respond to the gap in test results 
by setting overambitious goals that lead to poor outcomes in education. 
As an effect of this policy, in the initial sixteen months the number of students 
who passed standardized tests increases, leading to a positive and rising net change 
in the number of higher knowledge students. It leads to an improvement in the 
“students’ knowledge ratio”. However, since the level of such a ratio is still below the 
target, the school continues to divert the teaching time to the subjects on which 
standardized tests are done. This implies a prioritization of traditional teaching over 
holistic education. This phenomenon is captured by the increase in the “Balance and 
scope of learning ratio”: the higher this ratio is, the lower students’ holistic learning 
will be, because of the diminishing residual teaching time allocated to inter-
disciplinary projects, teamwork, and student portfolios. As an outcome of this side 
effect, after the ninth simulation month, the net change in higher knowledge students 
progressively decreases, and becomes negative after the fifteenth month. Such 
unintended outcomes are only latent until the sixteenth month. After that time, they 
become clear through a progressive decline in the number of higher knowledge 
students.  
The difficulty to perceive such phenomenon is associated with the feedback 
structure of the system, and namely with the delays affecting the two flows that lead 
to the net change in higher knowledge students. It is also associated with the 
diminishing returns of additional teaching hours allocated to tested subjects. The 
understanding of such counterintuitive behavior portrayed by the dynamic complexity 
of the analyzed system is a benefit of using a DPM model to enhance performance 
management. 
4.3) Policy recommendations 
This section has been devoted to outline a broader set of performance 
measures and targets intended to prevent and mitigate the narrowing of curricula in 
Colombian public schools.  
In Figure 8, the model in Figure 6 has been extended to show how an 
outcome-oriented view in performance management may positively affect the 
teaching time allocation in public schools. It has been proposed to assess outputs 
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Figure 8: A DPM model illustrating a policy based on the joint use of traditional and holistic education in Colombian public schools 
Lower knowledge 
students 
Higher knowledge 
students 
Increase in higher 
knowledge students 
Score inflation 
effect 
Effect of balance and 
scope of learning ratio 
 
Balance and scope of 
learning ratio 
Decrease time 
Rote learning effect 
Score inflation 
delay 
Benchmark for time allocation to 
traditional teaching 
Percentage of time allocated 
to traditional teaching 
Effect of time allocated to 
traditional teaching 
Increase time 
Rote learning 
delay 
Target of higher knowledge 
students 
Students’ knowledge ratio 
Desired time allocation 
to traditional teaching 
Time allocation to 
traditional teaching 
Adjustment time 
Net change in higher 
knowledge students 
 
Total school hours 
Chg. in time allocation to 
traditional teaching 
Time allocation to 
holistic education 
Chg. in time allocation 
to holistic education 
Percentage of time allocated 
to holistic education 
Desired time allocation 
to holistic education 
Gap in time allocation 
to holistic education 
Adjustment time 
Standard school hours 
Effect of time allocated to 
holistic education 
Holistic learning effect 
Holistic learning delay 
Decrease in higher knowledge students 
 
Combined rote and learning 
effect 
 
  
73 
and outcomes from both traditional (i.e. notion-based) and holistic (i.e. project-
based) education. While the former concerns the development of lower order 
thinking skills through rote learning and exam preparations, the latter refers to the 
development of higher order thinking skills (e.g. critical thinking, problem solving, 
teamwork aptitudes) that will allow students to solve real-life problems. 
Therefore, the suggested policy will allow public schools to complement the 
teaching of tested subjects (e.g. math, languages, social and natural sciences) with 
the development of a deep learning in students through activities such as inter-
disciplinary projects, group work, and student portfolios. Deep learning is the product 
from implementing a holistic education, which has been proved to be effective for 
enhancing performance in high-stake tests (Parker et al., 2011; Scogin et al., 2017; 
Ross et al., 2001; Levine, 1994; Thomas, 2000). 
In Figure 9 and Figure 10, the results from a simulation run of the extended 
model and an explanatory causal loop diagram are portrayed respectively. According 
to the simulation results, the public school can reduce its performance gap by 
increasing the time allocated to holistic education, which leads to raise the 
percentage of time allocated to holistic learning. As a consequence, the change in 
the number of higher knowledge students is affected positively. In the extended 
model, the “students’ knowledge ratio” is significantly lower than the benchmark. 
Initially, this condition makes the school increase the time allocated to traditional 
teaching to enhance such a ratio (loop B-1 in Figure 10). As a result, a positive net 
change in the number of higher knowledge students is perceived during the first 
sixteen months of the simulation. To keep the results of the above policy in the long-
term, the school must use overtime1. Therefore, the percentage of time allocated to 
holistic education (performance driver) must progressively be risen from 40% to 80% 
of standard school hours. As a result, a change in the loop dominance is perceived 
after sixteenth months because of an increase in the performance driver (loop B-2 in 
Figure 10).
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This condition leads to reach a substantial stability in the net change of higher 
knowledge students and to sustain the gains from the short-term policy illustrated in 
loop-B1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        ____________________________________ 
1 Colombian public schools often hire external contractors to train students for the standardized tests in out of 
school hours. In addition, regional governments and district education secretaries invest financial resources to 
develop extracurricular activities for improving students' performance in standardized tests. The educational 
policy, which is simulated by the extended model, implies the use of teacher overtime to foster a holistic 
education. This policy has been considered by most of the interviewees in this research as acceptable. 
Figure 9: Results from a simulation run illustrating the effects of combining traditional and holistic 
education in Colombian public schools 
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Posteriorly, from the twenty-second month, the school reduces the time 
allocation to traditional teaching from 60% to 25% because of an enhancement in its 
performance. It makes the “Balance and scope of learning ratio” improve, which in 
turn slows down the loop “R1” in Figure 10 since the increase in lower knowledge 
students is reduced. As a result, the net change of higher knowledge students is 
positively affected in the long-term.    
The above analysis shows how DPM can enhance the understanding of 
decision makers in complex and counterintuitive phenomena by identifying feedback-
loops and dynamic performance measures (i.e. strategic resources, performance 
drivers, end-results). In particular, in the case-study of the Colombian public schools, 
an instrumental view of DPM has been used to help system designers and decision 
makers deal with behavioral distortions caused by the use of output-oriented 
performance measurement systems. Assessing school performance, through 
standardized tests, is a government mechanism to hold public schools accountable 
for student achievement in the short-term. 
However, dysfunctional behaviors may emerge because of 1) an excessive 
pressure for increasing test scores, and 2) the adoption of inconsistent measurement 
systems. This condition may lead to a decline in school outcomes -such as 
Figure 10: Extending the scope of tests to holistic education in Colombian public schools 
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educational quality and social awareness- in the long-term. To avoid the previous 
side-effects, an extension in the boundaries of the adopted indicators has been 
proposed in this research by measuring the percentage of teaching time allocated to 
holistic education and its effect on school performance. As a result of this policy, an 
improvement in outputs and outcomes may be expected in the long-term. 
In brief, the use of DPM to outline school assessment systems may foster a 
paradigm shift from an output to an outcome-based view in performance 
management. Such a view may support decision makers to counteract the effects of 
static and simplistic indicators intended to measure student learning in public 
schools. 
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5) CONCLUSIONS       
5.1) Summary of the main discussions  
Behavioral distortions from the use of school performance measurement 
systems have been discussed throughout this dissertation. An approach from 
general to specific has been used to develop the contents. The next lines summarize 
the main discussions of the previous chapters and sections. 
In chapter 1, problem relevance, objective and research questions have been 
formulated. In particular, it has been discussed how the design of inconsistent 
performance measurement systems may trigger la emergence of behavioral 
distortions, which may produce a short-medium term increase in outputs and a long-
term decrease in outcomes. Therefore, an approach aimed at fostering a shift from 
an output to an outcome-based view in performance management is required to 
prevent and counteract such dysfunctional behaviors. To this end, the instrumental 
view of Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) has been suggested in this 
research. Moreover, in order to set the conceptual roots on how to outline outcome-
oriented performance measurement systems through DPM, the theory of street-level 
bureaucracies has been linked to the design of control systems through clan 
mechanisms.  
In chapter 2, the first three research questions have been approached by an 
exhaustive literature review. This chapter has been divided into eight sections with 
several subsections in each of them. The contents of these sections are briefly 
described below.  
In the first section, behavioral distortions from the use of performance 
measurement systems have been analyzed in a wide range of policy domains. In 
particular, the discussions of this section have been addressed by initially introducing 
broad concepts in performance measurement systems, intending to build basic 
notions for posterior analyses. Later, it has been discussed how performance 
indicators and several frameworks have been used in both public and private 
organizations to support decision-making. Posteriorly, criticisms and side-effects 
from the use of performance measurement systems in different policy settings have 
been debated. In addition, the relationship between the design and implementation 
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of output-oriented rewards, and the inclination of people to game the system has 
been explained. Finally, a broad spectrum of behavioral distortions in public schools 
have been discussed, and general recommendations to deal with them have been 
shared with the reader. 
In the second section, this research has mainly been focused on the study of 
behavioral distortions in school contexts due to inconsistent assessment systems. To 
support this endeavor, at beginning of this section, basic notions in school 
accountability have been provided to the reader. Then, the history of test-based 
accountability systems, the use of PISA as an assessment tool to measure students’ 
capacities for solving real-life problems, and the criticisms associated with the 
administration of standardized tests in public schools have been examined. 
Posteriorly, several recommendations to enhance school performance measurement 
systems and avoid common side-effects related to their adoption have been outlined 
by reviewing the preceding scientific literature.  
In the third section, the concept of educational quality has been examined. 
Several opinions from experts in the field and organizations involved in the education 
sector have been portrayed. In addition, The Synthetic Education Quality Index, 
designed to measure the Colombian educational quality in public and private 
schools, has been explained. In particular, the four dimensions of performance (i.e. 
progress, performance, efficiency, school environment) -that are used to track 
student progress and address organizational efforts towards the attainment of school 
outcomes- have been discussed. 
In the fourth section, the Colombian education system has been detailed. In 
particular, the organizational structure and the role of the most relevant internal units 
has been delineated. In addition, the academic levels and the legal framework, by 
which the education system is ruled in the country, have been described. Moreover, 
it has been explained why stakeholders in education (i.e. families, schools, 
government, and enterprises) should make coordinated efforts to achieve school 
outcomes in Colombia. 
In the fifth section, relevant standardized tests, which are administered in 
Colombian public schools, have been examined. In particular, the history of the use 
of “SABER”, “ICFES”, “TIMSS” and “PISA” -designed to support the measurement of 
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student performance and the development of education policies in the Colombian 
education sector- has been described throughout this section. In addition, the use of 
summative and formative assessments to enhance the learning process of 
Colombian students has been discussed. 
In the sixth section, opinions in favor and against the use of standardized tests 
to measure and track student achievement have been contrasted. Several scholars 
assert that standardized tests allow principals and schoolteachers to 1) know the 
competencies that students have gained over the years, and 2) develop school 
programs to reinforce strengths and mitigate weaknesses in the learning process. 
On the other hand, other scholars emphasize the detrimental effects that test-based 
accountability systems may trigger in the system, such as narrowing the school 
curricula to increase test scores. This section is concluded by depicting several 
recommendations on how to use standardized tests for reinforcing their advantages 
and minimizing their disadvantages. 
In the seventh section, the design of control systems in organizations has 
been covered. Initially, the components of organizational control systems have been 
detailed. Posteriorly, an emphasis on the diagnostic control system and its 
relationship with the interactive control system has been denoted. In particular, it has 
been discussed the need of complementing the single-loop learning with the double-
loop learning from the use of diagnostic and interactive control systems respectively. 
Then, the theory of street-level bureaucracy and the clan mechanism have been 
used to set the conceptual roots of an outcome-oriented view for outlining school 
performance measurement systems. At the end of this section, the need of 
implementing such view in the Colombian school context has been highlighted. To 
support this endeavor, Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) has been 
suggested. 
In the eight section, the instrumental view of DPM has been explained by 1) 
outlining how performance drivers impact on outcome and output end-results, 2) 
determining how end-results affect strategic resources, and 3) understanding how 
strategic resources and benchmarks define the dynamics of performance drivers. 
This approach has also been used to foster a shift from an output- to an outcome-
based view in performance management, intending to pursue sustainable outcomes 
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in the long-term. In the context of the Colombian public schools, DPM has been used 
to illustrate the weaknesses associated with the use of inconsistent performance 
measurement systems, and to support the design of a robust set of performance 
measures. 
In chapters 3 and 4, the last two research questions have been approached. 
In particular, in chapter 3 the research methodology has been explained. First, the 
rationale for adopting DPM to support the design and implementation of consistent 
school performance measurement systems has been elucidated. Second, the 
strategy for collecting primary and secondary data has been detailed. Both 
sequential exploratory design and document review have been carried out in this 
investigation. Posteriorly, the approach to build and validate the DPM model -for the 
case-study of the Colombian public schools- has been illustrated. Finally, data 
outputs of this research have been specified.  
In chapter 4, the modeling strategy and simulation results of the Colombian 
case-study have been discussed. Initially, a feedback view of behavioral distortions 
from the use of school assessment systems has been provided through a causal 
loop diagram (CLD). An emphasis on how dysfunctional behaviors may emerge as a 
result of perceived low performance ratios has been done. Posteriorly, problems with 
narrowing the curricula in Colombian public schools have been analyzed through a 
DPM chart and simulation runs from a DPM model. It implied that the adopted 
policies were examined by 2) distinguishing means from ends and identifying 
different “layers” of performance measures that captured contrasting time horizons, 
2) framing and simulating feedback structures to understand complex and 
counterintuitive behaviors, and 3) extending the boundaries of action not only to 
single organizations but also to other relevant stakeholders. Finally, policy 
recommendations on how to outline a broader set of performance measures and 
benchmarks to prevent school behavioral distortions have been delineated. To this 
end, an outcome-oriented view in performance management has been used. In 
particular, an educational policy -that complements the teaching of disciplines 
assessed through standardized tests (e.g. math, languages, natural and social 
sciences) with the development of student skills and attitudes through holistic 
activities (e.g. inter-disciplinary projects, group work, and student portfolios)- has 
been proposed at the end of this chapter. 
  
81 
5.2) Contribution to the existing knowledge  
This thesis has been aimed at contributing to the domain of the behavioral 
distortions associated with the use of school performance measurement systems. In 
particular, it has been shown how an inconsistent design of test-based accountability 
systems may jeopardize the attainment of school outcomes such as educational 
quality. The case-study of the Colombian public schools has been used to show how 
an outcome-based view in performance management can be useful to 1) challenge 
the consistency of the adopted indicators, and 2) deal with behavioral distortions, 
such as narrowing the school curricula to improve performance in standardized tests. 
Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) has been suggested to prevent and 
counteract such dysfunctional behaviors by understanding how policy levers and 
performance drivers impact on outputs and outcomes, and how such end-results 
feedback into strategic resources. 
The case-study has shown how both an excessive government pressure for 
improving performance in high-stake tests and the adoption of output-oriented 
reward systems have provoked the emergence of gaming behaviors in Colombian 
public schools (e.g. narrowing the curricula). In particular, an increase in the time 
allocated to traditional teaching to the detriment of a holistic education has been 
observed. Therefore, an extension of the system boundaries, from an output to an 
outcome-based view, is crucial to mitigate negative behavioral effects of using 
standardized tests to hold public schools accountable for student performance. In 
addition, the case-study has been used to highlight the need of 1) taking into account 
the socio-economic background where public schools operate, and 2) outlining a 
common shared view among distinct stakeholders in education, intending to pursue 
sustainable outcomes in the long-term. To this end, DPM has also been used to set 
the basis for policy discussion by filtering the insights from modeling and simulation 
through the lenses of decision makers in public schools.  
Finally, this research has suggested combining both traditional and holistic 
education to enhance the achievement of school outcomes. This approach implies 
that 1) a proper development of basic notions in different knowledge areas is a 
prerequisite for building higher order thinking skills in school students, and 2) the use 
of standardized tests to assess student performance is not bad per se because such 
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tests can support pedagogical processes. However, decision makers should know 
their limitations to maximize the benefits of using them. Therefore, test results should 
not be conceived as an absolute truth for policy making, but as a tool to enhance 
teaching strategies. The results from this research also suggest that an increase in 
test scores does not imply an increase in educational quality. However, it would be 
expected that an increase in educational quality would lead to an increase in test 
scores. 
5.3) Limitations and indications for further research  
The results should not be made generalizable because it was used a small 
sample size of schoolteachers to collect the primary data. Instead, this thesis should 
be seen as an initial step to analyze behavioral distortions in public schools through 
an outcome-oriented perspective in performance management. To this end, Dynamic 
Performance Management (DPM) has been implemented in the case-study of the 
Colombian public schools. As a result, a DPM simulation model has been built to 
prevent and counteract dysfunctional behaviors caused by the adoption of 
inconsistent performance measures. Such DPM model could be enhanced by 1) 
collecting additional data from the results of implementing the current standardized 
test system in Colombia, and 2) working in a multi-stakeholder setting to identify 
shared strategic resources and outline sustainable school policies through a 
collaborative perspective. This implies the need of broadening the focus of 
performance evaluation from test scores to the assessment of school and community 
outcomes (e.g. educational quality, social capital, civic-mindedness, social 
awareness, attractiveness of the local area, trust in government). 
Therefore, the development of further DPM models and case-studies -from 
different social contexts- will be needed to extend the boundaries of the research. 
This may lead to incorporate other important variables that may affect school 
performance (e.g. level of holistic skills). 
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APPENDICES 
A) Colombian reward system: Incentives for teachers and public schools                                      
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B) First survey  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This survey is part of the doctoral thesis conducted by the student Robinson Stevens Salazar 
Rua, who is enrolled in the program "Model Based Public Planning, Policy Design and 
Management” at the University of Palermo in Italy. The purpose of this survey is to 
determine how stakeholders in education impact on educational quality. To this end, the case 
of the Colombian public schools is analyzed through the lenses of a Dynamic Performance 
Management (DPM) approach.  
In order to collect the primary data of this research, this survey, based on open-ended 
questions, was designed. Participants are requested to analyze each of the questions in this 
document carefully. 
The information provided by the participants will be used for research purposes in this 
doctoral thesis and in academic publications. Participants are free to write their names, phone 
number and e-mail to be interviewed. The interviews will be recorded if the participants 
agree with it.  
Should you have questions, please contact me by the following e-mail address: 
rssalazarr@gmail.com 
 
 
 
Thanks for your participation. 
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Participant details 
Name:  
Current job position: 
Years of work experience in the education sector:  
Phone number/e-mail for the interview: 
Date: 
 
Note: Answers to the questions must be provided in order. This survey must be completed 
before December 15, 2016. 
Questions 
1) How do you define the concept “Educational quality”? 
2) What are your duties and responsibilities to improve student achievement in public 
schools? 
3) What should the role of stakeholders (i.e. schools, government, families, enterprises) 
be to improve educational quality? Do you think a gap between role expectations and 
role performance exists in the Colombian education system? Why?  
4) Do you think schoolteachers’ role is properly valued in Colombian society? If the 
answer is negative, do you think an undervalued perception of teaching activities may 
impact on educational quality? Why?  
5) What is your opinion about using standardized tests to measure educational quality? 
Do you think it is an appropriate approach? If the answer is negative, what do you 
suggest for tracking student progress and school performance? 
6) Which strategies have you ever used to improve student performance in standardized 
tests? Do you think such strategies also contribute enhancing the achievement of 
school outcomes? Have you ever observed unintended results of implementing such 
strategies in the medium and long-term?  
7) In the Colombian context, what are the main outcomes that might be attained if school 
performance is enhanced through a consistent design of education policies?  
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C) Second survey  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This survey is part of the doctoral thesis conducted by the student Robinson Stevens Salazar 
Rua, who is enrolled in the program "Model Based Public Planning, Policy Design and 
Management” at the University of Palermo in Italy. This survey has a dual purpose. In the 
first instance, it is aimed at understanding how standardized tests impact on the behavior of 
Colombian schoolteachers. In the second instance, it is aimed at validating the structure of a 
Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) model, which has been built to explain and 
counteract the negative effects of school practices aimed at increasing test scores. 
In order to collect the primary data of this research, this survey, based on open-ended 
questions and numerical reasoning, was designed. Participants are requested to analyze each 
of the questions in this document carefully. 
The information provided by the participants will be used for research purposes in this 
doctoral thesis and in academic publications. Participants are free to write their names, phone 
number and e-mail to be interviewed. The interviews will be recorded if the participants 
agree with it.  
Should you have questions, please contact me by the following e-mail address: 
rssalazarr@gmail.com 
 
 
 
Thanks for your participation. 
  
87 
Participant details 
Name:  
Current job position: 
Years of work experience in the education sector:  
Phone number/e-mail for the interview: 
Date: 
 
Note: Answers to the questions must be provided in order. This survey must be completed 
before January 10, 2019. 
Questions 
1) What kind of education do you consider the most appropriate to build higher order 
thinking skills (e.g. critical thinking, problem-solving, and teamwork)? Why? 
2) Based on your experience, how long does it take a student to gain an adequate level of 
higher order thinking skills? 
3) In an "ideal" school, how much time of the school year should be devoted to activities 
that look for developing higher order thinking skills? Why? 
4) Do you think the current standardized tests are aligned with an education that fosters 
the development of higher order thinking skills? Why? 
5) How much time of the school year does your school allocate to exam preparations? Is 
it possible to increase/decrease such time allocation under certain circumstances? If 
the answer is positive, could you quantify it? 
6) Do you think school strategies intended to develop higher order thinking skills may 
impact on test scores? How? 
7) Do you think resource investments to improve performance in standardized tests can 
also enhance the development of higher order thinking skills? How?  
8) Based on your experience, how much time does a public school require improving its 
performance in standardized tests significantly?  
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9)  How often does your school adjust its policies and strategies? 
10)  What are the effects of prioritizing traditional education (i.e. teaching aimed at 
building basic notions in students through rote learning activities and exam 
preparations) over holistic education (i.e. teaching aimed at building higher order 
thinking skills)? 
11) Which of the following options do you consider the closest one to reality? Why? 
(Note: Read the statement carefully and underline the option in italics that is most 
appropriate) 
• The time to increase the number of lower knowledge students to higher 
knowledge students is greater than / equal to / less than the time to decrease the 
number of higher knowledge students to lower knowledge students.  
12)  Could you quantify the previous statement?  
• Example: I think the time to increase the number of lower knowledge students to 
higher knowledge students is 5 times greater than / less than the time to decrease 
the number of higher knowledge students to lower knowledge students. 
Graphs 
You are requested to plot X vs. Y graphs in this section, intending to determine the 
relationship between the variables (Note: In all the statements, the first variable corresponds 
to the X-axis and the second variable corresponds to the Y-axis). 
a) Students knowledge ratio (Higher knowledge students over Target of higher 
knowledge students) and Desired time allocation to traditional teaching 
b) Percentage of time allocated to traditional teaching and its effect on the increase in 
higher knowledge students 
c) Percentage of time allocated to traditional teaching and its effect on the increase in 
lower knowledge students 
d) Percentage of time allocated to holistic education and its effect on the increase in 
higher knowledge students 
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D) Model documentation 
1) DPM model - Initial version 
Stocks and flows 
Higher knowledge students (t) = Higher knowledge students (t - dt) + (Increase in 
higher knowledge students - Decrease in higher knowledge students) * dt INIT = 10 
(students) 
Inflow: 
Increase in higher knowledge students = ('Lower knowledge students' / 'Increase time') * 
'Rote effect' 
Outflow: 
Decrease in higher knowledge students= ('Higher knowledge students' / 'Decrease time') * 
'Score inflation effect' 
Lower knowledge students (t) = Lower knowledge students (t - dt) + (Decrease in higher 
knowledge students - Increase in higher knowledge students) * dt INIT = 40 (students) 
Inflow: 
Decrease in higher knowledge students = ('Higher knowledge students' / 'Decrease time') * 
'Score inflation effect' 
Outflow: 
Increase in higher knowledge students = ('Lower knowledge students' / 'Increase time') * 
'Rote effect' 
Teaching time allocation to tested subjects (t) = Teaching time allocation to tested 
subjects (t - dt) + (Chg in teaching time allocation to tested subjects) * dt INIT = 0.25 
(dimensionless) 
Inflow and Outflow: 
Chg in teaching time allocation to tested subjects = ('Desired teaching time allocation to 
tested subjects' - 'Teaching time allocation to tested subjects') / 'Adjustment time' 
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Auxiliaries and parameters 
Net change in higher knowledge students= 'Increase in higher knowledge students' - 
'Decrease in higher knowledge students' 
Students knowledge ratio= 'Higher knowledge students' / 'Target of higher knowledge 
students' 
Percentage of time allocated to tested subjects= 'Teaching time allocation to tested subjects' / 
'Total school hours' 
Balance and scope of learning ratio= 'Percentage of time allocated to tested subjects' / 
'Benchmark for time allocation to tested subjects' 
Score inflation effect= DELAYINF('Effect of balance and scope of learning ratio','Score 
inflation delay',2,0) 
Rote effect= DELAYINF('Effect of time allocated to tested subjects','Rote delay',2,0) 
Effect of balance and scope of learning ratio= GRAPH('Balance and scope of learning 
ratio',1,0.2,{1,1.007,1.052,1.225,1.509,1.861,2.213,2.610,2.865,2.985,3//Min:1;Max:3//} 
Effect of time allocated to tested subjects= GRAPH('Percentage of time allocated to tested 
subjects',0.25,0.055,{1,1.022,1.086,1.206,1.367,1.558,1.708,1.839,1.929,1.978,1.993//Min:1;
Max:2//}) 
Desired teaching time allocation to tested subjects= GRAPH('Students knowledge 
ratio',0,0.0833,{0.8,0.798,0.792,0.784,0.749,0.703,0.633,0.499,0.367,0.304,0.271,0.254,0.25
0//Min:0.25;Max:0.8//}) 
Adjustment time = 12 (months) 
Score inflation delay= 36 (months) 
Rote delay=12 (months) 
Increase time = 24 (months) 
Decrease time=3 (months) 
Target of higher knowledge students = 45 (students) 
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Benchmark for time allocation to tested subjects = 0.25 (dimensionless) 
Total school hours = 1 (dimensionless) 
2) DPM model - Extended version 
Stocks and flows 
Higher knowledge students (t) = Higher knowledge students (t - dt) + (Increase in 
higher knowledge students - Decrease in higher knowledge students) * dt INIT = 10 
(students) 
Inflow: 
Increase in higher knowledge students= ('Lower knowledge students' / 'Increase time') * 
'Combined rote and learning effect' 
Outflow: 
Decrease in higher knowledge students= ('Higher knowledge students' / 'Decrease time') * 
'Score inflation effect' 
Lower knowledge students (t) = Lower knowledge students (t - dt) + (Decrease in higher 
knowledge students - Increase in higher knowledge students) * dt INIT = 40 (students) 
Inflow: 
Decrease in higher knowledge students= ('Higher knowledge students' / 'Decrease time') * 
'Score inflation effect' 
Outflow: 
Increase in higher knowledge students= ('Lower knowledge students' / 'Increase time') * 
'Combined rote and learning effect' 
Time allocation to holistic education (t) = Time allocation to holistic education (t - dt) + 
(Chg in time allocation to holistic education) * dt INIT = 0.4 (dimensionless) 
Inflow and Outflow: 
Chg in time allocation to holistic education= 'Gap in time allocation to holistic education' / 
'Adjustment time' 
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Time allocation to traditional teaching(t) = Time allocation to traditional teaching (t - 
dt) + (Chg in time allocation to traditional teaching) * dt INIT = 0.6 (dimensionless) 
Inflow and outflow: 
Chg in time allocation to traditional teaching= ('Desired time allocation to traditional 
teaching' - 'Time allocation to traditional teaching') / 'Adjustment time' 
Auxiliaries and parameters 
Total school hours= 'Time allocation to holistic education' + 'Time allocation to traditional 
teaching' 
Percentage of time allocated to holistic education= 'Time allocation to holistic education' / 
'Standard school hours' 
Percentage of time allocated to traditional teaching= 'Time allocation to traditional teaching' / 
'Standard school hours' 
Balance and scope of learning ratio= 'Percentage of time allocated to traditional teaching' / 
'Benchmark for time allocation to traditional teaching' 
Combined rote and learning effect= 'Rote learning effect' * 'Holistic learning effect' 
Net change in higher knowledge students= 'Increase in higher knowledge students' - 
'Decrease in higher knowledge students' 
Gap in time allocation to holistic education= 'Desired time allocation to holistic education' -
'Time allocation to holistic education' 
Students knowledge ratio= 'Higher knowledge students' / 'Target of higher knowledge 
students' 
Score inflation effect= DELAYINF('Effect of balance and scope of learning ratio','Score 
inflation delay',2,0) 
Rote learning effect= DELAYINF('Effect of time allocated to traditional teaching','Rote 
learning delay',2,0) 
Holistic learning effect= DELAYINF('Effect of time allocated to holistic education', 'Holistic 
learning delay',2,0) 
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Effect of balance and scope of learning ratio= GRAPH('Balance and scope of learning 
ratio',1,0.2,{1,1.007,1.052,1.225,1.509,1.861,2.213,2.610,2.865,2.985,3//Min:1;Max:3//}) 
Effect of time allocated to traditional teaching= GRAPH('Percentage of time allocated to 
traditionalteaching',0.25,0.055,{1,1.022,1.086,1.206,1.367,1.558,1.708,1.839,1.929,1.978, 
1.993//Min:1;Max:2//}) 
Effect of time allocated to holistic education= GRAPH('Percentage of time allocated to 
holisticeducation',0.25,0.055,{0.2,0.6,1.2,1.9,3.13,4.54,6.34,8.1,9.12,9.58,9.96//Min:0;Max: 
10//}) 
Desired time allocation to traditional teaching= GRAPH('Students knowledge 
ratio',0,0.0833,{0.8,0.798,0.792,0.784,0.749,0.703,0.633,0.499,0.367,0.304,0.271,0.254,0.25
0//Min:0.25;Max:0.8//}) 
Adjustment time=12 (months) 
Score inflation delay= 36 (months) 
Rote learning delay= 12 (months) 
Holistic learning delay= 24 (months) 
Increase time= 24 (months) 
Decrease time= 3 (months) 
Target of higher knowledge students= 30 (students) 
Desired time allocation to holistic education= 0.8 (dimensionless) 
Standard school hours= 1 (dimensionless) 
Benchmark for time allocation to traditional teaching= 0.25 (dimensionless) 
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